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ABSTRACT
This Article tells the story of how fundamental shifts in state
sentencing policy collided with fundamental shifts in federal habeas
policy to produce a tangled and costly doctrinal wreck. The
conventional assumption is that state prisoners seeking habeas relief
allege constitutional errors in their state court convictions and
sentences. But almost 20 percent of federal habeas petitions filed by
noncapital state prisoners do not challenge state court judgments.
They instead attack administrative actions by state prison officials or
parole boards, actions taken long after the petitioner’s conviction and
sentencing. Challenges to these administrative decisions create serious
problems for federal habeas law, which is designed to structure
federal review of state court judgments and is ill suited to review
administrators’ actions. Courts find themselves trying to squeeze
square pegs into round holes, and the confusion is particularly
intolerable given the stakes for prisoners, state prison systems, and
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federal courts. This Article is the first to identify this significant
problem, to analyze its disparate and complicated causes, and to
propose a simple and rational way for Congress to respond.

INTRODUCTION
When legislators and judges change legal rules, they necessarily
rely on background assumptions about how those rules operate in the
world. If their assumptions are incorrect, the legal changes are likely
to have unintended consequences. That is the story we tell here about
federal habeas corpus law. It is a story that echoes others that have
occurred in the wake of the nationwide shift to determinate
sentencing and is as significant and as troubling as those better-known
tales.
Since the 1950s, developments in the law governing the scope of
federal habeas review for state prisoners have proceeded on the
assumption that a state prisoner seeking habeas relief is attacking the
legality of his confinement by alleging a constitutional error in the
decision that led to his incarceration. The conventional assumption is
thus that federal habeas petitions ask federal courts to review earlier
rulings by state courts. Habeas is considered collateral review
precisely because it reviews state court judgments that have already
been subjected to direct review. It might come as a surprise, then, to
learn that almost 20 percent of federal habeas petitions filed by state
prisoners do not challenge state court judgments. They attack instead
the constitutionality of administrative actions by state prison officials
or parole boards, actions taken long after the petitioner’s conviction
and sentencing.
Challenges to administrative rather than judicial decisions have
created two problems that we explore in this Article. First, the habeas
remedy overlaps with the federal cause of action for civil rights
violations, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Courts must decide which statutory
scheme to apply, and existing doctrines governing that choice are
both theoretically and practically unsound. Second, to the extent that
the habeas statute is applied, it is designed to structure federal court
review of state court judgments and is therefore ill suited for review
of actions by prison administrators. Thus, courts reviewing
administrative actions under the rubric of habeas corpus find
themselves trying to squeeze square pegs into round holes.
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In this Article we set out for the first time the story of how this
disconnect between statutory remedies and constitutional claims
developed and document the magnitude of the resulting
jurisprudential morass. We trace how the legislative transformation of
sentencing policy generated unanticipated procedural challenges for
courts. The confusion we describe is particularly intolerable given the
stakes: prisoners in these cases are challenging a deprivation of
liberty, already stretched state resources are squandered in the
resulting litigation, and federal courts are unnecessarily burdened.
The existing patchwork of mismatched laws poorly serves prisoners,
state corrections systems, and the federal judiciary. Moreover, the
percentage of habeas petitions raising these claims is not likely to
decrease anytime soon. We argue that as prison populations and the
number of federal habeas claims continue to escalate, it is time for
Congress to respond to these developments directly. And despite the
depth and breadth of the problems with existing law, we believe they
can be remedied with a few simple statutory changes.
We begin in Part I with an introduction to the problem,
describing the statutory background and explaining the origin and
scope of the current difficulties. Part II focuses on the doctrines that
separate habeas claims from § 1983 claims. In Part II.A we provide a
theoretical critique of the Court’s jurisprudence, arguing that its
interpretation of the reach of these two statutory remedies is not
consistent with several principles that undergird the general doctrines
governing federal court review of state decisions. The Court’s
distinction between cases that may be filed as civil rights claims and
those that must be filed in habeas is also very unclear, and Part II.B
shows the effect of this confusion on the lower courts. We turn in Part
III to the specific mismatch between the statutory habeas provisions
and cases challenging decisions by state officials regarding the
administration of sentences, cataloguing five separate aspects of
habeas law that have troubled courts trying to review administrative
actions. Finally, in Part IV, we suggest a simple solution that is
tailored specifically to the problems in these cases that the law can no
longer ignore.
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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
A. The Statutory Background
State prisoners with constitutional claims have, at least in theory,
two different routes to obtain review of those claims in federal district
court. First, claims alleging unconstitutional conduct by governmental
actors (including prison and parole officials) fall within the scope of
1
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the general civil rights statute. Section 1983 allows a
civil suit—for damages or equitable relief—against any defendant
who, “under color of” state law, deprives the plaintiff of “any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
Challenges to prison conditions make up a large proportion of cases
2
filed nationwide under § 1983. State prisoners suing under § 1983
must satisfy the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
3
4
(PLRA), passed in 1996 to address frivolous prisoner lawsuits. Three
provisions of the PLRA are important for our purposes. Unlike other
§ 1983 plaintiffs, who are not required to exhaust any available state
5
remedies, prisoners must first exhaust state administrative remedies
6
before filing suit in federal court. The PLRA also added a monetary

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
2. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1571 (2003) (listing
“general living-conditions claims” as one of the “leading topics” of inmate litigation).
3. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–10, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66
to -77 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
4. See, e.g., Brian J. Ostrom, Roger A. Hanson & Fred L. Cheesman II, Congress, Courts
and Corrections: An Empirical Perspective on the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1525, 1525–26 (2003) (attributing the PLRA’s passage to the rapid rise, onerous
volume, and low success rate of prisoner litigation in the 1990s); Schlanger, supra note 2, at 1559
(noting that concern about frivolous lawsuits eased the PLRA’s passage).
5. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982) (reaffirming precedent holding
that § 1983 plaintiffs do not need to exhaust administrative remedies).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000). This requirement in the PLRA was new. No statutory
provision governed the exhaustion of state remedies by prisoners bringing § 1983 suits until
1980, when the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) first authorized judges in
their discretion to require exhaustion of administrative remedies if specified conditions were
met. See Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7, 94 Stat. 349, 352
(1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000)) (authorizing judges to require
exhaustion if “appropriate and in the interests of justice”); Eugene Novikov, Comment,
Stacking the Deck: Futility and the Exhaustion Provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 817, 818–20 (2008) (contrasting the CRIPA and the PLRA exhaustion
requirements); Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: The
Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1803–05 (2003) (same).

2008]

HABEAS CORPUS AND STATE SENTENCING

5

deterrent to frivolous filings: prisoners with sufficient funds must pay
7
a partial filing fee at the time of suit and the balance over time, and
prisoners who have filed three suits dismissed as frivolous, malicious,
or not stating a claim must pay the full filing fee up front for any
8
subsequent suit. Finally, the PLRA requires the court to screen a
prisoner’s complaint before ordering the defendant to answer; the
court may make such an order only if it finds that “the plaintiff has a
9
reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits.”
The second federal remedy theoretically available to a prisoner is
the writ of habeas corpus. Habeas relief is available to those “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
10
United States” and is used primarily by prisoners challenging the
legality of their convictions or sentences. Unlike § 1983, which until
1996 did not require state prisoners to exhaust state remedies, the
habeas statute has expressly required prisoners to raise their claims in
11
state courts since 1948. Congress added new restrictions on habeas
relief in 1996 when it enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
12
Penalty Act (AEDPA), including a statute of limitations for filing, a
bar to successive petitions, and new barriers to appeal.
We focus in this Article on a particular sort of constitutional
claim: a challenge to a state administrative decision that affects how
much of a sentence a prisoner must actually serve in custody. We call
these sentence-administration claims. These claims do not question
the validity of the sentence itself or the underlying conviction.
Instead, they contest decisions that parole or corrections officials
make after conviction and sentence. Administrative decisions relating
to sentence administration can be grouped into three main categories:

7. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2000); Schlanger, supra note 2, at 1628.
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (precluding such prisoners from bringing actions in forma
pauperis).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2).
10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (2000).
11. 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 23.1, at 1049 (5th ed. 2005) (noting that prior to its codification in 1948, state
court exhaustion had been required by common law since 1886). In 1996, the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) authorized federal judges to deny (but not grant)
unexhausted claims. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A) (2000)).
12. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40 and 42 U.S.C.).
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(1) revocation of supervised release or parole; (2) denial or deferral
of an inmate’s release on parole; and (3) the revocation of earned
13
good-time credits, usually imposed after a disciplinary hearing as a
14
sanction for misconduct. A prisoner challenging one of these
administrative decisions typically alleges that he was denied his
federal due process rights at the hearing leading to the decision. A
prisoner may also allege that in making the decision, state officials
applied a revised statute or policy, which violated his rights under the
Ex Post Facto Clause.
These sentence-administration claims are neither fish nor fowl:
unlike most habeas petitions, they do not challenge state court
convictions or sentences; unlike most other prisoner litigation against
corrections officials, they do not attack conditions of confinement. As
we show in this Article, courts have difficulty both determining which
statutory scheme should govern and applying the statutory
requirements. These difficulties evolved out of the combination of six
significant legal developments that now interact in ways that neither
Congress nor the courts anticipated. The next Section describes those
developments.
B. How the Problems Developed: The Perfect Storm
1. The Court Expands Liberty Interests (1972–1979). The
mismatch between claims and remedies that we address in this Article
began with the expansion of prisoners’ rights under the Due Process
Clause during the last phases of the Supreme Court’s due process
revolution in the 1970s. The constitutional right to due process applies

13. Good-time credits (sometimes known as earned-release credits, flat-time credits, or
“gain time”) may accrue with the passage of time at a rate set by statute or regulation, or with
participation in particular prison programs, and can be revoked for misconduct. See WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.2(c), at 1223–24 (4th ed. 2004) (summarizing
several states’ practices).
14. State prisoners may also allege that corrections officials failed to properly credit them
with time served on other sentences or outside prison, or failed otherwise to properly calculate
their presumptive release dates. E.g., Jhanjar v. Cal. Dep’t. of Corr. & Rehab., No. 1:06-CV00637AWI-TAGHC, 2008 WL 850195, at *1, *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008) (recommending that
the court deny relief to an inmate who claimed that prison officials should have reduced his
parole term by credits); Rider v. Quarterman, No. 3:07-CV-0789-N ECF, 2007 WL 4226378, at
*1, *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2007) (denying relief to an inmate who challenged the refusal of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice to give him credit for the “street time” he served on
parole before his parole was revoked and he was reincarcerated).
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only to governmental decisions that deprive a person of life, liberty,
or property. Between 1972 and 1979, the Supreme Court decided
three landmark cases identifying new “liberty” interests that
dramatically expanded the scope of constitutional claims available to
15
state prisoners.
Before 1972, it was not clear whether sentence-administration
decisions by state corrections and parole officials were subject to
constitutional regulation at all. Under prior interpretations of due
process, a prisoner’s early release from confinement could be seen as
a privilege, entirely discretionary with the state, rather than an
16
entitlement that the state could not withdraw without due process.
17
In that year, the Court held in Morrissey v. Brewer that parolees do
have a liberty interest in their continued release on parole, which
18
states cannot revoke without due process. In 1974, in Wolff v.
19
McDonnell, the Court extended Morrissey to decisions that revoked
earned good-time credits and delayed the date of presumptive
20
release. Five years later in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal
21
& Correctional Complex, the Court recognized a liberty interest in
the denial or delay of release on parole if the state parole system
22
created an entitlement to release after a set amount of time served.
In particular, the Court held in Greenholtz that a state’s decision to

15. These decisions were among several issued during the same period that increased the
categories of interests protected by procedural due process. 2 NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAW OF
PROBATION AND PAROLE § 18.2, at 18-9 (2d ed. 1999). For an excellent general overview of the
development of federal court oversight of state prisons during the 1960s and 1980s, see
MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN
STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 39–46 (1998).
16. See, e.g., Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 282, 286–87 (1971)
(collecting cases holding parolee had no right to a hearing before revocation because release
was considered an act of grace); Sharif A. Jacob, Note, The Rebirth of Morrissey: Towards A
Coherent Theory of Due Process for Prisoners and Parolees, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1213, 1214–15
(2006) (tracing developments prior to Morrissey).
17. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
18. Id. at 483 (“[W]hether the parolee’s liberty is a ‘right’ or a ‘privilege[,]’ . . . the liberty is
valuable . . . . Its termination calls for some orderly process, however informal.”).
19. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
20. Id. at 556–58.
21. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
22. See id. at 11–12 (concluding that Nebraska’s parole statute gives prisoners an
expectation of parole meriting constitutional protection).
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deny parole must meet minimum due process standards. These cases
made it possible for state prisoners to raise constitutional challenges
to sentence-administration decisions that had previously been
unregulated by federal law.
Notably, the Court has never recognized a liberty interest in
early release if state law leaves the timing of that release entirely to
24
the discretion of the state. Under most state systems in effect in the
1970s, sentences were indeterminate and the decision whether to
25
grant parole was within the parole board’s discretion. In such fully
discretionary systems, decisions denying release or revoking goodtime credit need not comply with the requirements of procedural due
26
process. Wolff and Greenholtz therefore affected only the states that
had adopted presumptive release and eliminated discretionary parole.
The next development—a wave of state sentencing reforms that
would move the nation away from discretionary to presumptive
release—had yet to take hold.
2. The Decline of Indeterminate Sentencing and the Rise of
Presumptive Release (1976–2002). When Wolff and Greenholtz were
decided, their impact was limited. Most states had indeterminate
sentencing schemes, and as a result their prisoners had no
constitutionally protected expectation of release at any particular

23. See id. at 15 (requiring the state to follow a “procedure [that] adequately safeguards
against serious risks of error”). The Court held that Nebraska’s procedure satisfied due process
by providing each inmate advance written notice of a hearing, an opportunity to be heard at the
hearing, and an explanation of the reasons if release is denied. Id. at 14–15 & n.6. The Court
also held in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985),
that due process requires that decisions to deny release must be supported by “some evidence,”
id. at 455.
24. See, e.g., Teague v. Quarterman, 482 F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir. 2007) (contrasting
discretionary parole with mandatory release); cf. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995)
(finding that no due process protections were required for the disciplinary hearing at issue,
distinguishing Wolff, and noting that the case was not one in which the “State’s action w[ould]
inevitably affect the duration of his sentence”).
25. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, PRISON SENTENCES AND TIME SERVED FOR
VIOLENCE 1, (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin No. NCJ 153858, Apr. 1995), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/psatsfv.pdf (“In 1977, 72% of those released from State
prisons had served an indeterminate sentence, and a parole board decided their release.”).
26. See Teague, 482 F.3d at 774 (holding that no constitutional right or expectancy to parole
exists if the decision to grant parole is “within the . . . unfettered discretion of the State”). All
parole revocations, however, have been subject to due process constraints since Morrissey. See
supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
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time prior to the termination of their maximum sentence. In these
states administrative decisions altering the expected time of
consideration for release did not need to comply with due process.
But since the 1970s, there has been a striking shift away from
discretionary parole release systems with indeterminate sentences to
mandatory release systems with determinate sentences. In a
mandatory or presumptive release system, release on parole is
required or presumed once the prisoner serves a minimum term,
27
reduced by earned good time. Unlike earlier indeterminate
sentencing systems that left the timing of release entirely to the
discretion of the paroling authorities once the minimum term had
been served, these newer statutes create an entitlement to release
upon the expiration of the minimum term, unless the state makes
particular findings. A decision to deny or delay consideration for
release under these determinate sentencing laws triggers due process
requirements because it deprives the prisoner of a liberty interest.
This shift in sentencing law, however, occurred many years after
the Supreme Court in Wolff and Greenholtz first recognized that
liberty interests were created by presumptive release statutes. Of the
states that chose to abolish discretionary parole between 1976 and
2000—making release mandatory absent particular findings—most
28
did so after 1989. “By the end of 2002, just 16 states still gave their
27. GREENFELD, supra note 25, at 1 (reporting that as of 1995, most state prisoners were
serving presumptive sentences and that 90 percent of state inmates could estimate their
probable release date). A prisoner’s discharge from prison in 1992 was less likely than in 1977 to
be determined by a parole board decision. In 1977, 72 percent of those released from State
prisons had served an indeterminate sentence, and a parole board decided their release. In 1992,
by contrast, less than 40 percent of prison releases were determined by a parole board. Id.; see
also Christy A. Visher, Returning Home: Emerging Findings and Policy Lessons about Prisoner
Reentry, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 93, 98 (2007) (reporting that the portion of prisoners released by
parole boards dropped from 65 percent in 1976 to 24 percent in 1999). For one useful summary
of this shift and the forces that brought it about, see JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS
COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 55–75 (2003).
28. PETERSILIA, supra note 27, at 66–67 tbl.3.1 (noting that the states eliminating
discretionary parole release in favor of mandatory release schemes in the 1990s were Arizona
(1994), Delaware (1990), Kansas (1993), Mississippi (1995), North Carolina (1994), Ohio (1996),
Virginia (1995), and Wisconsin (1999)); see also Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s
Dilemma: Consequences of Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491,
497–504 (2008) (“Between 1990 and 1999, the number of discretionary parole
releases . . . declined nearly twenty percent, while the number of mandatory parole releases
almost doubled.”). These changes occurred, at least in part, because of the Truth in Sentencing
federal funding initiative. See PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, TRUTH IN
SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 1 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report No. NCJ 170032,
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parole boards full authority to release inmates through a discretionary
29
process.” Of the seven states with the largest prison populations in
the country—California, Texas, Florida, New York, Georgia,
Michigan, and Ohio—all but one use mandatory release schemes for
30
at least some offenders. Moreover, even as states adopted new
sentencing laws, it sometimes took years for federal courts to hold
definitively that a new state law created a liberty interest. Texas
moved to mandatory release in the late 1970s, but it was not until
2007 that the Fifth Circuit held as a matter of first impression that the
Texas statute created a liberty interest in release that triggered due
31
process whenever credits were revoked. And it was not until 2002
that the Ninth Circuit squarely held that language in California’s

Jan. 1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf (linking Truth in
Sentencing reform to parole’s curtailment).
29. PETERSILIA, supra note 27, at 65.
30. Michigan is the only one of these states whose parole board retains full discretion to
grant parole. Hopkins v. Mich. Parole Bd., 604 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Mich. App. 1999). The other
states have moved at least partially to mandatory release regimes. See Schwartz v. Dennison,
518 F. Supp. 2d 560, 571–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that although New York’s parole scheme
generally does not create a liberty interest, N.Y. Correctional Law § 805, added in 1987, does);
PETERSILIA, supra note 27, at 66–67 tbl.3.1 (noting that Georgia restricts parole for prisoners
who have committed “several felonies”); TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2006
STATISTICAL REPORT 29 (2006), available at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/publications/executive/
FY_2006_Statistical_Report.pdf (reporting the percentage of prisoners Texas released through
discretionary release in 2006); Bureau of Justice Statistics, Reentry Trends in the U.S.: Releases
from State Prison, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/reentry/releases.htm (reporting that California,
New York, and Ohio have abolished discretionary parole at least in part). For a state-by-state
listing of prison populations, see WILLIAM J. SABOL & HEATHER COUTURE, PRISON INMATES
AT MIDYEAR 2007, at 3 tbl.2 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin No. NCJ 221944, June 2008),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pim07.pdf.
31. Teague v. Quarterman, 482 F.3d 769, 775–78 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that Texas’s
mandatory supervision scheme both before and after it was amended on September 1, 1996
created a liberty interest in release and rejecting Fifth Circuit decisions that had held that de
minimis changes in the duration of custody did not implicate due process); Malchi v. Thaler, 211
F.3d 953, 957–58 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that Texas’s pre-1996 mandatory release scheme
created a liberty interest for prisoners). Texas has both discretionary release and mandatory
release. See TEX. BD. OF PARDON & PAROLES, PAROLE IN TEXAS 7 (2005), available at
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/bpp/publications/PIT_eng.pdf. A large proportion of inmates
continue to be subject to mandatory release laws. See TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra
note 30, at 29 (indicating that only 44 percent of prison releases in 2006 were for discretionary
parole, whereas the remainder of prison releases occurred because sentences expired or as part
of some type of mandatory supervised release). “Texas accounted for one in nine state prisoners
released throughout the United States in 2001.” As Texas’s Prison Population Experiences FiveFold Growth Since 1980, Urban Centers Contend with Influx of Former Inmates, URBAN INST.,
Mar. 19, 2004, http://www.urban.org/publications/900689.html.
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32

revised statute, passed in 1976 and governing the largest correctional
33
system in the nation, creates a liberty interest in release on parole so
34
that parole hearings must comply with Greenholtz and its progeny.
As the states enacted (and the courts confronted) schemes that
created an entitlement to release, the Court’s expansion of procedural
due process rights for prisoners thus took on more importance and
allowed more prisoner challenges to sentence-administration
schemes.
Notably, this was not the only surprise in store for courts once
states began to abandon their trust in the discretion of judges and
parole authorities to calibrate sentencing, and to replace that
discretion with inflexible terms of incarceration. The shift to
determinate sentencing in the 1980s and 1990s also produced a wave
of challenges alleging that the new sentencing procedures violated the
accused’s right to have a jury determine guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt of every element of an offense, which led ultimately to the
Court’s stunning constitutional ruling invalidating the application of
35
mandatory guidelines in several jurisdictions. A wave of legislation
in reaction has followed, with many states abandoning mandatory
36
guidelines and returning to more discretionary systems. It will be
interesting to see if eventually states respond similarly in the context
of parole, and reinstate discretionary release as they recognize the
litigation consequences of the decision to move to mandatory release.
Those consequences were not apparent as states began to eliminate
discretionary release. They were shaped by four additional
developments in the law, described below.

32. California Penal Code § 3041, the parole statute, was rewritten as part of California’s
Determinate Sentencing Law in 1976. 1976 Cal. Stat. 5151.
33. See JOAN PETERSILIA, CAL. POLICY RESEARCH CTR., UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA
CORRECTIONS 1, 60 (2006), available at http://www.ucop.edu/cprc/documents/understand_ca_
corrections.pdf (reporting that although California’s system holds one of every nine people
incarcerated in state prisons across the United States, only 17.4 percent of California’s prison
population is serving an indeterminate sentence subject to discretionary release).
34. See McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901–02 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that California
Penal Code § 3041(b) (2000) was “largely parallel” to the statute addressed in Greenholtz); see
also Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 2006) (reaffirming that
California’s parole statute creates a due process liberty interest in release on parole).
35. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004); see also United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 266–67 (2005).
36. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.4, at 39–40 (4th ed. Supp.
2007).
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3. The Court Distinguishes Habeas and § 1983 Cases: Phase I
(1973–1974). Before this combination of constitutional interpretation
and state sentencing reform expanded the decisions subject to
constitutional challenge, the Court decided another series of cases
that ultimately had the effect of channeling these claims into federal
habeas proceedings.
As noted in Part I.A, a prisoner’s allegation that prison officials
violated the Constitution when making an administrative decision
affecting release appears, on its face, to fall into the intersection of
37
38
the general civil rights statute, § 1983, and the habeas statute. The
choice between these two statutory remedies carries consequences—
several procedural restrictions apply in habeas cases but not in § 1983
cases, including a requirement that the prisoners must first exhaust
their constitutional claims in the state courts.
Right about the time the Court was recognizing new liberty
interests—but well before so many states shifted to determinate
sentencing—the Court decided two cases in an attempt to pin down
exactly which prisoner claims were cognizable exclusively in habeas
and which could be brought under § 1983. The Court first confronted
39
this issue in 1973, in Preiser v. Rodriguez. In Preiser, state prisoners
brought a § 1983 action alleging that prison disciplinary proceedings
40
had unconstitutionally deprived them of good-time credits. They
sought restoration of the credits, a remedy that would have
41
“result[ed] in their immediate release from confinement.” The Court
first explained that when a prisoner’s suit falls within the “core” of
42
The
habeas jurisdiction, habeas is the exclusive remedy.
quintessential example of a claim within the core of habeas is a
challenge to the validity of the prisoner’s conviction or sentence, that
is, a claim that the police, the prosecutor, the defense lawyer, the jury,
or the court made a constitutional error resulting in an unlawful
conviction or sentence. Habeas was the exclusive remedy for such

37. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
38. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (2000).
39. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
40. Id. at 476–77.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 487–89 (reasoning that in cases within the core of habeas jurisdiction,
Congress intended to apply the more specific habeas statute rather than the general civil rights
statute).

2008]

HABEAS CORPUS AND STATE SENTENCING

13

claims, the Court reasoned, because if prisoners were permitted to
challenge their convictions by bringing suit under § 1983, they could
evade the procedural restrictions that Congress had imposed on
43
habeas relief. A prisoner challenging the conditions of confinement,
44
continued the Court, is permitted to bring suit under § 1983.
Because the petitioners in Preiser challenged neither their state
court judgments nor the conditions of their confinement, it was not
clear whether their claims arose under habeas or § 1983.
Nevertheless, the Court held that they had to file their claims under
the habeas statute because they were “attacking the validity of the
45
fact or length of their confinement.” In other words, the Court said,
§ 1983 cannot be used to seek relief that results in either “immediate
46
release” or “shortening the length of . . . confinement.” The Preiser
Court explicitly limited its holding to suits seeking accelerated
release:
If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is attacking something
other than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking
something other than immediate or more speedy release—the
traditional purpose of habeas corpus. In the case of a damages claim,
habeas corpus is not an available or appropriate federal remedy.
Accordingly, as petitioners themselves concede, a damages action by
a state prisoner could be brought under the Civil Rights Act in
federal court without any requirement of prior exhaustion of state
47
remedies.

A year later, the Court applied the distinction it drew in Preiser
between habeas and § 1983 claims. In Wolff v. McDonnell it held that
a prisoner could use § 1983 to seek damages and declaratory relief in
a class action challenging the procedures used to impose a loss of
good-time credits and could also seek a prospective injunction
requiring the prison to use constitutionally adequate procedures in

43. See id. at 490–92 (explaining the importance of exhaustion).
44. See id. at 498 (citing, inter alia, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Houghton v.
Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968)).
45. Id. at 490.
46. Id. at 487.
47. Id. at 494 (emphasis omitted).
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the future. Only the actual restoration of good-time credits was a
remedy exclusive to habeas and beyond the scope of § 1983.
These early interpretations of the intersection between the
federal habeas statute and § 1983 did funnel some sentenceadministration cases into habeas during the 1970s. But their real
impact was to come later, after more states adopted sentencing laws
that conferred an entitlement to release and thus a basis for
constitutional challenges to sentence-administration decisions.
4. Changes in Prison Population (1990–2004). The Court’s
expansion of the liberty interests of prisoners, the shift away from
discretionary to mandatory release laws, and the early decisions in
Preiser and Wolff were not the only developments that contributed to
an increase in the number of prisoners seeking habeas relief for
sentence-administration claims in the last decades of the twentieth
century. Beginning in the 1990s, the prison population itself was
changing in ways that promised to produce a larger proportion of
sentence-administration claims among the habeas petitions filed in
federal court.
First, over this period, a decreasing percentage of prisoners were
entering prison for their initial sentences, while a growing portion of
those admitted were “violators,” coming back to prison after their
parole had been revoked. Violators grew to more than a third of all
49
state prison admissions by 1998, double the proportion in 1980.

48. Wolff v. McDonell, 418 U.S. 539, 554–55 (1974); see also supra notes 19–20 and
accompanying text.
49. See TRACEY L. SNELL, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1993,
at 12 tbl.1.11 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Report No. NCJ 156241, rev. Oct. 1996), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpop93bk.pdf (reporting that in 1980, 17 percent of
inmates admitted to state prisons were violators); CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1998, at 59 tbl.5.10a (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Report No. NCJ 192929,
Sept. 2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpus98.pdf (reporting that in 1998
violators made up 36 percent of inmates admitted to state prison); see also WILLIAM J. SABOL,
TODD D. MINTON & PAIGE M. HARRISON, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2006, at 4
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin No. NCJ 217675, rev. Mar. 2008), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim06.pdf (showing that 34 percent of state prison
inmates admitted in 2005 were parole violators); Ryan S. King, Recent Developments in State
Parole Reform, 2004–2006, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 124, 124 (2007) (describing the boom in parole
violator admissions). California, the state with the nation’s largest prison population, see supra
note 33 and accompanying text, had an incredibly high rate of returning violators, see
PETERSILIA, supra note 33, at 11 (reporting that 61.5 percent of inmates in California returning
to prison are violators). Although many states continued to prosecute parolees anew for crimes
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Prisoners are limited to one, timely filed petition challenging their
50
conviction and sentence, absent exceptional circumstances. Because
violators have already served part of their sentence prior to release,
they would have already had the opportunity to file that petition
when first incarcerated and would be less likely than new prison
admittees to file such a petition. But throughout the remainder of
their custody, violators could continue to attack the constitutionality
of each and every decision made by state prison and parole
authorities affecting the timing of their release. As a result, an
increase in the proportion of prisoners returned after release logically
would increase the percentage of habeas petitions that attack
sentence-administration decisions rather than criminal judgments.
Second, from 1990 to 2002 the average time a state prisoner
51
remained in custody increased. Because decisions affecting the
timing of release occur repeatedly during a prisoner’s stay, these
longer periods of incarceration produce more administrative decisions
for prisoners to challenge. Finally, state prison populations grew in
absolute terms, jumping from 295,819 in 1980, to 684,544 in 1990, to
52
1,395,916 in 2007.

they committed on release, California preferred less demanding administrative revocation
procedures to secure reincarceration—80 percent of parolees who returned to prison were
reincarcerated for criminal offenses that the state never prosecuted separately. See id. at 73–74
(dubbing these violations “administrative criminal returns”).
50. See infra Part III.C.
51. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE
COURTS, 2002, at 5 tbls. 4, 6 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin No. NCJ 206916, Dec. 2004)
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fssc02.pdf (“[I]t is estimated that felons
sentenced in 2002 would serve about 2¼ years, or 51% of their average 4½ year prison
sentence.”); DITTON & WILSON, supra note 28, at 8–9 (reporting that the percentage of
sentences that violent prisoners served increased from 47 percent in 1993 to 54 percent in 1997);
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 2003, at 511 tbl.6.44 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 2005), available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t644.pdf (reporting that, between 1990 and 1999, the
average time served, excluding life sentences, jumped seven months for first releases from state
prison, and the percentage of state prison sentence served increased from 38 percent to 49
percent).
52. ALLEN J. BECK & DARRELL K. GILLIARD, PRISONERS IN 1994, at 2 (Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Bulletin No. NCJ-151654, Aug. 1995), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/pi94.pdf (reporting state prison populations for 1980 and 1990); SABOL & COUTURE, supra
note 30, at 1 tbl.1 (reporting 2007 prison populations). Indeed, in states in which prison
construction could not keep up with the explosion in prison population, increasing reliance on
good time for early release has served as a stop gap, see PETERSILIA, supra note 27, at 62, which
exacerbates the problem we address in this article.
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These three shifts in state prison populations further magnified
the effect of Greenholtz, Wolff, and the ongoing move to determinate
sentences, increasing the proportion of habeas petitions that raised
sentence-administration claims. These changes, however, were only
53
just developing in the early 1990s, as the Court and Congress
decided to modify the availability and nature of the statutory
remedies governing these claims, two developments we describe next.

53. Some state legislators learned the unexpected consequences of eliminating
discretionary parole release much later. For example, Colorado’s Interim Committee on
Criminal Sentencing received this appraisal in 2002:
Returns to prison have increased faster than admissions to prison from court
commitments. . . . One reason for the increase in return admissions is the result of
mandatory parole passed by House Bill 93-1302. A mandatory parole period for every
inmate has contributed to the growth in the parole population and has increased the
chances and opportunities for revocation.
Memorandum from Jonathan Lurie, Colo. Legislative Council Staff, to Members of the Interim
Comm. on Criminal Sentencing 1–2 (Aug. 13, 2002), available at http://www.state.co.us/gov_|
dir/leg_dir/lcsstaff/2002/research/ParoleRevPopulation.PDF.
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5. The Court Distinguishes Habeas and § 1983 Cases: Phase II
(1994–1997). The precarious distinction drawn by Preiser and Wolff
lasted for twenty years. It began to unravel in the mid 1990s, in a
series of decisions that forced more sentence-administration claims
out of § 1983 and into habeas. The first of these cases the Rehnquist
Court took up was that of a prisoner challenging his conviction but
seeking damages for constitutional violations rather than release. This
was a “core” habeas claim, but it did not seek the traditional habeas
54
remedy. Could it be brought under § 1983? In Heck v. Humphrey
the Court said no. It held that that a prisoner’s suit for damages is not
cognizable under § 1983 (and thus sounds exclusively in habeas) if “a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” unless the conviction or
55
sentence had already been invalidated in some other proceeding.
56
57
The Court dismissed statements to the contrary in Preiser as dicta.
The Heck doctrine has come to be known as the “favorable
termination” rule, as it conditions a § 1983 suit on a prior favorable
termination of a challenge to the underlying conviction or sentence.
In 1997, the Court extended the application of Heck from
challenges to state criminal judgments to challenges to decisions made
58
in administering the sentence. In Edwards v. Balisok, the Court
applied Heck’s favorable termination rule to a suit for damages that
alleged constitutional flaws in prison disciplinary procedures that had
59
resulted in the deprivation of good-time credits. The plaintiff, Jerry
Balisok, explicitly sought damages only, and he sought them for the
denial of due process (he argued that prison officials gave him no
opportunity to put on a defense and that the hearing officer was
biased) and not for the deprivation of good-time credits. Yet the
Court held that the due process violations that he alleged “would, if
established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his
60
good-time credits.” The invalidity of that deprivation, in turn, would
necessarily require a restoration of the credits and therefore a

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Id. at 487.
See supra text accompanying note 47.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 481–82.
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997).
Id. at 643.
Id. at 646.
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61

shortening of the prisoner’s sentence. The claim was therefore not
cognizable under § 1983 absent a prior determination of the invalidity
of the deprivation by a state court or through a writ of habeas corpus
in federal court.
Once Edwards was combined with the changes in sentencing and
release law described in Part I.B.3, it ultimately channeled more
sentence-administration challenges into habeas. The federal courts
might have been able to accommodate these claims under the habeas
doctrines that applied through the mid-1990s. But yet another
development, almost simultaneous to the doctrinal change worked by
Edwards, altered the law of habeas and made sentence-administration
claims more difficult to fit into the habeas framework.
6. Congress Enacts the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) (1996). In 1996, Congress enacted the
62
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, imposing several
new requirements on habeas petitions and codifying others that had
originally been developed by the Supreme Court. It is the application
of AEDPA to sentence-administration claims that has created the
specific problems that we detail in Part III. But when Congress
adopted AEDPA, it did not anticipate these problems.
Habeas reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s grew out of
frustration with federal review of state capital convictions and
63
sentences. Some recognized that a change in habeas provisions
would reach beyond the tiny fraction of petitions filed by death row
inmates, and argued that some of the proposed restrictions were not
64
needed in noncapital cases. But in the years leading up to passage of
AEDPA there is no indication in the legislative history that
lawmakers anticipated the application of the new provisions to

61. Id. at 647.
62. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40 and 42 U.S.C.).
63. H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (noting the “acute problems of
unnecessary delay and abuse in capital cases”); see also Federal Habeas Corpus Reform:
Eliminating Prisoners’ Abuse of the Judicial Process: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. passim (1995); S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 8 (1995); sources cited infra note 68.
64. See, e.g., Habeas Corpus Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.
430 (1990) (prepared statement of Larry W. Yackle, Professor, Boston University School of
Law).
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attacks by noncapital state prisoners on administrative decisions that
affected the timing of their release from prison.
Given the relatively low profile that sentence-administration
claims had at the time, this omission is not surprising. AEDPA was
enacted in 1996, a full year before the Court in Edwards applied the
Heck rule to sentence-administration claims. In 1996 such claims
could still be brought under § 1983 as long as the prisoner did not
actually seek release. The most recent Supreme Court decision
addressing prison disciplinary proceedings at the time was Sandin v.
65
Conner, a § 1983 case that not only did not mention habeas corpus at
all but also cited a long string of challenges to disciplinary hearings
66
that had also been brought under § 1983.
Moreover, in 1996, the significant shift from discretionary parole
to presumptive release and the impact of that shift on constitutional
challenges to prison discipline proceedings probably was not yet
understood. Many states did not adopt truth-in-sentencing initiatives
limiting discretionary parole for violent offenders until after Congress
provided monetary incentives for them to do so in the Violent Crime
67
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, and prisoners sentenced
under these revised schemes had yet to reach state prisons. In short,
just as the Court in Preiser might not have anticipated the subsequent
expansion of constitutional challenges to sentence-administration
decisions, Congress appears not to have anticipated the application of

65. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
66. Id. at 477–79 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480 (1980); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Montanye
v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974)). The Court had just issued its decision rejecting a habeas challenge to
parole procedures on ex post facto grounds in 1995. Cal. Dep’t. of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S.
499, 504 (1995).
67. See DITTON & WILSON, supra note 51, at 3 (noting that of the fourteen states that had
abolished discretionary parole release, eight did so “during the same year a truth-in-sentencing
law was passed”); WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., THE
INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING
PRACTICES AND PRISON POPULATIONS 23–27 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/
uploadedPDF/410470_FINALTISrpt.pdf (examining the effects of the grants program
established by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, tit. I, subtit. A, 108 Stat. 1796, 1815–19 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701–09
(2000)), and concluding that 21 states changed sentencing structures after the Act, and that in
five of those states the federal program was a major factor in enacting the state’s truth-insentencing law).
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the new habeas statute to administrative decisions regarding good
68
time and parole.
C. The Magnitude of the Problem
Nearly one-fifth of state prisoners’ noncapital habeas petitions
filed in federal district courts between 2003 and 2004 challenged not
the legality of the conviction or sentence, but the constitutionality of a
decision by state corrections or parole officials regarding the
69
administration of the petitioner’s sentence. The percentage was even
higher in the states with the largest prison populations: 22 percent of
noncapital petitions in the Eastern District of California and the
Northern District of Florida raised this type of claim, about a third of
petitions filed by prisoners in Texas (35 percent) and Pennsylvania’s
Middle District (32 percent) did so, and most (61 percent) of the
habeas petitions from Indiana prisoners contested sentence70
administration decisions, not criminal judgments.
Thus in Indiana, the primary function of federal habeas review is
to examine the decisions of state corrections officials, not state courts,
and in several other states it serves this role in a significant

68. See, e.g., Crouch v. Norris, 251 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting that “[t]he scant
legislative history discussing the purpose of AEDPA’s habeas restrictions indicates that
Congress was concerned with delay and finality” and holding that a challenge to the application
of parole statutes does not threaten the validity of the inmate’s conviction and sentence, which
both state and federal courts have already reviewed). As Judge Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit
has written about the original rules governing habeas cases:
The Form included in the Rules’ appendix also clearly contemplates challenges to
trials or sentences, and not to administrative proceedings such as parole hearings. For
example, the Form asks whether the petitioner has appealed his conviction, and not
whether he has appealed any adverse administrative actions. The Form specifies the
ten “most frequently raised grounds for relief in habeas corpus proceedings”—all
concerning trial-related rights. Moreover, other than “[d]enial of effective assistance
of counsel” and “[d]enial of right of appeal,” all the grounds specified in the Form
expressly attack the underlying conviction (e.g., “Conviction obtained by use of
coerced confession.”).
Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 810–11 (11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring). Nor
does anything suggest that drafters of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts considered this type of challenge when amending the rules in 2002 after
Congress passed AEDPA.
69. NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL TECHNICAL
REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 26 (2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf (reporting that, in study using a nationwide random sample of
habeas cases that state prisoners had filed in 2003 and 2004 under AEDPA, 17.8 percent of filers
“alleged a constitutional flaw in a post-commitment administrative proceeding”).
70. Id.
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percentage of cases. Nationwide, more habeas petitions are filed
including a sentence-administration claim (claim included in 18
71
percent of all noncapital cases) than are filed challenging a prisoner’s
conviction or sentence on the basis of lost, suppressed, undisclosed, or
false evidence (claim included in 13 percent of all noncapital cases) or
on the basis of an invalid plea, including those alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel regarding the plea process (claim included in
72
14.8 percent of all noncapital cases).
Moreover, this litigation over sentence-administration claims is
extremely unproductive. In the study, of 2,384 noncapital habeas
cases randomly selected from those filed nationwide in 2003 and 2004,
only about one-third of 1 percent of noncapital habeas petitions filed
(seven cases total) received any relief, and none of the claims granted
73
relief were sentence-administration claims. A study with a larger
sample would probably include some cases granting relief for
74
prisoners’ sentence-administration claims, but there is no reason to
believe that the win rate for inmates challenging sentenceadministration decisions is any greater than the rate for prisoners
challenging the legality of their original convictions and sentences.
The filing of so many overwhelmingly nonmeritorious claims not only
burdens federal courts, but it also prejudices the rare prisoner with a
meritorious claim. As Justice Jackson pointed out in a 1953 case
expanding the availability of federal habeas, “[h]e who must search a
haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the
75
needle is not worth the search.”
Not only is this litigation voluminous and overwhelmingly futile,
but habeas petitions that raise sentence-administration claims also
pose unique challenges for federal courts. Litigants and courts in
these cases must navigate both the Preiser line of cases and AEDPA’s
restrictions. As we explain in the next two Parts, both have generated
71. Id.
72. Id. at 30.
73. Id. at 52 (reporting a grant rate of 0.29 percent).
74. Prisoners have raised successful constitutional challenges to sentence-administration
decisions. See, e.g., Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 538, 548 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that a
governor denied the prisoner due process when the governor twice reversed the parole board’s
decision to grant parole to an inmate); Teague v. Quarterman, 482 F.3d 769, 781 (5th Cir. 2007)
(holding that an inmate is entitled to due process when the inmate faces losing previously
earned good-time credit in a disciplinary hearing).
75. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result).
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uncertainty, inconsistency among the circuits, and additional confused
litigation. A decade of attempts to make sense of these claims under a
statute that did not anticipate them has failed to bring coherence to
this sizeable and expensive segment of federal court litigation.
II. CHOOSING PEGS AND HOLES: HABEAS OR § 1983?
The first problem with the current regime is the line drawn by
Preiser and its progeny. The Court has never adequately explained
why prisoners who are not seeking release as a remedy should
nevertheless be required to bring their claims in habeas, nor has it
clearly defined the difference between claims that necessarily imply
the invalidity of the sentence and claims that do not. In the two
sections of this Part, we first argue that the existing doctrinal rules fail
to take into account three fundamental principles that permeate the
law governing federal court adjudication and then describe the lower
court confusion that demonstrates the hopeless indeterminacy of the
rules.
A. An Unjustifiable Distinction
In Preiser the Court essentially distinguished between claims of
unconstitutional incarceration and claims of other unconstitutional
acts by prison administrators. The latter may be brought under
§ 1983, whereas the former must be brought as habeas petitions. To
the extent that habeas imposes more onerous procedural obstacles,
forcing claims of unconstitutional incarceration into habeas thus
treats them less favorably and subjects them to less federal oversight
than other constitutional claims against prison administrators. In
particular, habeas, unlike § 1983, requires exhaustion of state judicial
76
77
remedies, has a short statute of limitations, prohibits most attempts
78
to bring a second or successive petition, and imposes sharp limits on
79
appeals.
But treating claims of unconstitutional incarceration stemming
from actions by state prison officials less favorably than other
constitutional claims against the same defendants—and on par with
76.
77.
78.
79.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2000).
See id. § 2244(d).
See id. § 2244(b).
See id. §§ 2254(d)–(e).
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claims of unconstitutional incarceration pursuant to a court
judgment—departs from three fundamental principles that are
reflected in many other doctrines. In general, the law recognizes
(1) that similar claims by state and federal prisoners have similar
access to judicial review, (2) that federal courts are more reluctant to
interfere with the judgments of state courts than with the actions of
other, nonjudicial state actors, and (3) that deprivations of physical
liberty are the most egregious invasions of liberty. In this section, we
briefly canvas the doctrinal support for these three principles and
show how applying the Preiser rule to sentence-administration claims
is inconsistent with each.
1. Treating Similar Claims by State and Federal Prisoners
Similarly. The Preiser doctrine unjustifiably distinguishes between
state and federal prisoners who challenge the constitutionality of
decisions by prison administrators. This is inconsistent with the
general practice of treating challenges to the constitutionality of state
80
and federal acts similarly. In prison litigation, most challenges other
than sentence-administration claims are treated the same whether
they are brought by state or federal prisoners. When a state prisoner
alleges a defect in his conviction or sentence under § 2254 or a federal
prisoner attacks his conviction or sentence under § 2255, the parallel
provision governing collateral relief for federal prisoners, federal law
treats the claim similarly: AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement, oneyear statute of limitations, successive petition restrictions, and limits
on appeals all apply to both. Similarly, challenges to prison conditions
81
are treated similarly regardless of the prison system. Under Preiser,

80. The Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine, for example, extends most of the
Bill of Rights (originally applicable only to federal action) to states. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.3.3, at 499–500, 503–04 (3d ed. 2006). Limitations on “citizen
standing,” which prevent most suits based on generalized grievances against governmental
actions, protect both state governments and the federal government. See, e.g., Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 489–90
(1982) (dismissing a challenge to the constitutionality of federal government action); Doremus
v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434–35 (1952) (dismissing a challenge to the constitutionality of a
state statute). Similarly, state and federal legislators get the same level of immunity. See
Jacobson v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1365 (9th Cir. 1977) (acknowledging
state and federal legislators are both afforded absolute immunity), aff’d in relevant part sub
nom. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
81. State prisoners file under § 1983; federal prisoners file under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens and its progeny
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however, as we detail in Part III, several of AEDPA’s restrictions
govern sentence-administration claims by state prisoners but not
those brought by federal prisoners.
2. Stricter Oversight of Administrative Compared to Judicial
State Action. Although existing law thus draws an unwarranted
distinction between the review provided state and federal prisoners, it
fails to draw a different distinction that is warranted: between the
review of claims that a state court has wrongfully ordered the
complainant imprisoned and the review of claims that a state prison
or parole official has wrongfully done so. As a matter of federalism
and comity, federal courts usually tread more lightly when reviewing
the actions of state courts than when reviewing the actions of other
state actors. This comity is reflected in the greater restrictions
imposed on collateral review of state court decisions in habeas
compared to review of nonjudicial state officials under § 1983, in
which prisoners are not required to exhaust state judicial remedies
and the court reviews the official’s acts de novo. Within habeas, the
Supreme Court has recognized that “the need for collateral review is
most pressing” when the imprisonment results from executive rather
82
than judicial action. Even leaving habeas aside, the Anti-Injunction
Act prohibits federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings
83
but not state administrative proceedings. The Full Faith and Credit
Act requires a federal court to give the same preclusive effect to a
state court judgment that another court in the state would give it, but
84
the act does not apply to state administrative proceedings. The
permit suits against federal officers for money damages by implying a cause of action directly
from certain constitutional provisions. Id. at 392 (implying the cause of action directly from the
Fourth Amendment).
82. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269 (2008).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000). As one court has noted, “[w]hile the Supreme Court has
expressly declined to address whether the Anti-Injunction Act applies to state administrative
proceedings, every circuit to have addressed the question has held that it does not.” Entergy,
Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 900 (8th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted) (citing Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 573 n.12 (1973)).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). The Supreme Court instead decides on a statute-by-statute
basis whether Congress intended federal courts to give preclusive effect to state agency
proceedings. See, e.g., Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108, 110–11
(1991) (noting that “the question is not whether administrative estoppel is wise but whether it is
intended by the legislature” and finding no preclusive effect in ADEA cases); Univ. of Tenn. v.
Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796, 799 (1986) (holding that state court judgments have no preclusive
effect in Title VII cases but have preclusive effect in § 1983 cases).
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Younger doctrine, which places additional, extrastatutory limits on
injunctions and declaratory judgments against state judicial
85
proceedings, is only sometimes applied to state administrative
86
proceedings. Evaluated in light of ordinary distinctions between
state judicial and administrative proceedings then, the Preiser
doctrine has it backward. An approach more consistent with this basic
principle that federal courts should be freer to overturn state
administrative actions than state judicial actions would be to place
fewer procedural limits on prisoners challenging the actions of state
administrative officials than on those challenging the actions of state
courts.
3. Stricter Oversight of Deprivations of Physical Liberty. A
more consistent approach would also treat claims of unjustified
detention as a result of state officials’ unconstitutional actions more
favorably than claims that the same officials violated other
constitutional guarantees short of deprivations of physical liberty.
That the loss of physical freedom is among the greatest trespasses on
liberty is almost self-evident. The very existence and structure of the
writ of habeas corpus is based on this principle. Habeas, a venerable
judicial remedy against governmental action and the only one
87
mentioned by the Constitution, is available only to test the legality
88
of custody (or other restraints on physical liberty). It is also the only
remedy that allows lower federal courts to reexamine the judgments
of state courts. In an ordinary civil case, only higher state courts and
the United States Supreme Court may review state court judgments.
If someone brings suit in federal district court asking that court to
review or reverse a state court judgment, the suit either will be

85. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971).
86. See, e.g., Executive Art Studio, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 179 F. Supp. 2d 755, 758
(W.D. Mich. 2001) (“[T]he Supreme Court has extended Younger to state civil enforcement
proceedings and state administrative proceedings which are judicial in nature.” (emphasis
added)).
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
88. See, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1000
(1985) (“[T]he ‘custody’ requirement does operate as a gate-keeping device. It screens cases
according to the nature of the individual interests at stake, limiting relitigation to cases in which
petitioners allege unlawful restraints on liberty.”).
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jurisdictionally barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or will be
90
dismissed as precluded under the Full Faith and Credit Act. Habeas,
91
however, is an exception to both doctrines. Similarly, although the
degree of deference accorded to state court judgments in federal
habeas cases has varied over time, federal habeas courts have never
been required to give state decisions the same preclusive effect that
the Full Faith and Credit Act accords in other contexts. Preiser itself
recognized that “[p]rinciples of res judicata are, of course, not wholly
92
applicable to habeas corpus proceedings.” By exempting habeas
petitions—and only habeas petitions—from the ordinary doctrines
that prevent lower federal court review of state judgments, American
jurisprudence recognizes that custody represents an extraordinary
incursion on liberty.
At the same time, however, Congress has chosen to place
restrictions on habeas that do not apply when a prisoner sues under
§ 1983 claiming that prison conditions—but not his incarceration—
violate constitutional standards. To the extent that Preiser forces
“core” challenges to convictions and sentences into habeas, it
arguably implements the congressional trade-off between deferring to
state court decisions and avoiding unconstitutional incarceration. But
extending Preiser to sentence-administration claims—which challenge

89. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291–92 (2005); D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 415–16 (1923); see also Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The RookerFeldman Doctrine in Action, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1088 (1999) (describing lower court
use of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000); see also, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S.
367, 386 (1996) (finding preclusive effect when nothing suggested that Congress “meant to
override the ‘principles of comity and repose embodied in § 1738’” (quoting Kremer v. Chem.
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 463 (1982))); Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S.
75, 84 (1984) (“[Section 1738] embodies the view that it is more important to give full faith and
credit to state-court judgments than to ensure separate forums for federal and state claims.”);
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (“Congress has specifically required all federal courts
to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which
the judgments emerged would do so.”).
91. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. at 292 n.8 (“Congress . . . may explicitly empower district
courts to oversee certain state-court judgments and has done so, most notably, in authorizing
federal habeas review of state prisoners’ petitions.”). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is also
inapplicable to suits challenging the actions of state prison officials. See, e.g., Schnitzler v.
Reisch, No. CIV 06-4064, 2008 WL 895843, at *1 (D.S.D. Mar. 31, 2008) (mem.) (finding that
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply in a challenge to the actions of a state parole board).
92. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497 (1973).
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not the decisions of courts but those of administrators—cannot be
93
justified on this ground. Nor, as we suggested in Part I, is it fair to
attribute to Congress any intent to make this trade-off with regard to
sentence-administration challenges. Thus, it is one thing for prisonconditions challenges to be easier to bring than challenges to
convictions or sentences: the two claims are apples and oranges, with
different defendants, different decisionmaking contexts, and different
factors to weigh in the balance. It is quite another, however, to place
more limits on challenges to decisions by the very same corrections
officials if the decisions result in increased incarceration than if they
do not.
B. Lower Court Chaos
Not only is the Preiser line of cases theoretically incoherent, but
it also has created substantial practical difficulties for the federal
judiciary. Lower courts evaluating sentence-administration claims
have always had trouble applying the Heck formulation, which
requires a judge to determine whether a judgment in favor of the
prisoner “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
94
95
sentence.” In 2005, in Wilkinson v. Dotson, the Court made it even

93. See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text.
94. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). For example, the Court found that it had
to clarify that, contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the precedent, Heck and Edwards
apply only to prison disciplinary proceedings that affect the length of the prisoner’s sentence;
challenges to changes in confinement conditions that do not affect sentence duration are
cognizable under § 1983 even absent a prior favorable termination. Muhammad v. Close, 540
U.S. 749, 754–55 (2004) (per curiam). That the Sixth Circuit ever thought otherwise indicates
the confusion that this line of precedent engendered. Even in 2008, four years after Muhammad,
some district courts incorrectly applied Heck to challenges to disciplinary sanctions that appear
to have no effect on the length of sentence. See, e.g., Rasulallah v. Norris, No. 5:07CV00323
SWW, 2008 WL 192959, at *1–2 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 22, 2008) (finding that Heck and Edwards
applied when an inmate challenged disciplinary proceedings that punished him with segregation
and stripped him of privileges); Chandler v. Rivera, No. 1:07CV145-MP/AK, 2008 WL 170327,
at *1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2008) (distinguishing Muhammad and finding that Heck and Edwards
applied when an inmate challenged disciplinary proceedings that placed him on “close
management”); Woods v. Carmichael, No. 4:07-cv-119-DPJ-JCS, 2007 WL 4268782, at *2 (S.D.
Miss. Nov. 30, 2007) (mem.) (dismissing, based on Edwards and Heck, an inmate’s challenge to
a prison’s disciplinary action); Maxwell Bey v. Parks, No. 407-CV-13941, 2007 WL 3038001, at
*1–2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2007); Carter v. Curry, No. 9:07cv57, 2007 WL 3036425, at *6 (E.D.
Tex. Oct. 17, 2007) (mem.) (“A civil rights lawsuit is not the proper method of challenging
disciplinary cases.”).
95. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005).
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more confusing. Each of the prisoners in Wilkinson brought a § 1983
suit for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that application of
parole guidelines enacted after his original conviction and sentence
violated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses of the
96
Constitution. The Court found each of these challenges cognizable
under § 1983 because a favorable ruling would not necessarily imply
the invalidity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration but would at
97
most entitle him to a new, constitutionally adequate, parole hearing.
At those hearings, the prisoner might or might not succeed in gaining
early release. As Justice Kennedy pointed out in dissent, however, the
same could be said of any challenge to any sentencing proceeding: a
second sentencing hearing might result in a shorter sentence, but it
98
might also result in the same sentence or even a longer one.
Moreover, the same argument that worked for the prisoners in
Wilkinson should have worked for Jerry Balisok, who had sought only
a new disciplinary hearing that might or might not have ended with
99
the same deprivation of good-time credits.
Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Wilkinson chastised the majority for
100
“blur[ring] the Preiser formulation.” Justice Kennedy was right
about the blurriness of the line between habeas and § 1983 but wrong
in attributing the problem solely to the holding in Wilkinson. Lower
courts have had trouble applying Preiser and its progeny both before
101
and after Wilkinson.
Let us begin by considering two cases at opposite ends of the
Preiser spectrum. In one, a state prisoner alleged that a state court

96. Id. at 77.
97. Id. at 82.
98. Id. at 88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
99. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997).
100. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
101. Some commentators, too, lamented the lack of coherence in the Supreme Court’s cases
even before Wilkinson. See, e.g., Martin A. Schwartz, The Preiser Puzzle: Continued Frustrating
Conflict Between the Civil Rights and Habeas Corpus Remedies for State Prisoners, 37 DEPAUL
L. REV. 85, 88 (1988); Maureen A. Dowd, Note, A Comparison of Section 1983 and Federal
Habeas Corpus in State Prisoners’ Litigation, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1315, 1315–16 (1984);
Jason A. Jones, Note, Prisoner Litigation and the Mistake of Jenkins v. Haubert, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 140, 140 (2000); Eric J. Savoy, Comment, Heck v. Humphrey: What Should State Prisoners
Use When Seeking Damages from State Officials . . . Section 1983 or Federal Habeas Corpus?, 22
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 109, 109 (1996); Benjamin Vetter, Comment,
Habeas, Section 1983, and Post-Conviction Access to DNA Evidence, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 587,
600–06 (2004).
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violated his constitutional rights when it refused to recognize a
defense of diminished responsibility at his trial. In the other, a
prisoner in one state sued officials of another for constitutional flaws
in the process by which they extradited him to the state in which he
was convicted and incarcerated. Keep in mind that the Supreme
Court has held that “[t]he jurisdiction of the court in which the
indictment is found is not impaired by the manner in which the
102
accused is brought before it.” Can the prisoners bring any of these
claims under § 1983, or may they only seek habeas relief because a
favorable resolution would “necessarily imply the invalidity of [the
103
prisoner’s] conviction or sentence”?
The Eleventh Circuit held the first claim cognizable under § 1983
because “[e]ven with evidence of [the defendant’s] alleged mental
state at the time of the offense, a jury would still have the option of
convicting [him],” and thus awarding damages and a declaratory
judgment would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the
104
conviction. As to the second scenario, two courts of appeals have
held that challenges to extradition procedures cannot be brought
under § 1983, because “the . . . claim for damages would, if proven,
105
necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence.” Both
answers are wrong: the diminished responsibility case is a classic,
“core” habeas challenge to a wrongful conviction, and the extradition
cases do not implicate the validity of the conviction or sentence
because the conviction stands even if the extradition was
unconstitutional. If courts cannot consistently apply Preiser and Heck
to these easy cases, it is no surprise that the cases closer to the line are
in disarray.
The Preiser questions arise most commonly in several recurring
situations. Prisoners often bring § 1983 suits to challenge the
procedures used in disciplinary hearings, and courts must determine
whether Heck bars those claims if the hearings resulted in either the
102. Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537, 544 (1893); see also Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519,
522 (1952) (“There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person
rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will.”).
103. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).
104. Cooper v. Florida, 196 F. App’x 793, 795 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
105. Knowlin v. Thompson, 207 F.3d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 2000); accord Pullen v. Keesling, 9 F.
App’x 882, 883–84 (10th Cir. 2001). Other circuits disagree. See Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d
1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 2007); Young v. Nickols, 413 F.3d 416, 417 (4th Cir. 2005); Harden v. Pataki,
320 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003).
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deprivation of good-time credits or a change in status that impairs the
106
prisoner’s ability to earn such credits. Similarly, challenges to the
107
procedures used in parole hearings raise Heck issues.
Understandably, some courts, desperate for simplicity, have
misinterpreted the Court’s precedent as creating bright-line rules.
Several courts have suggested that no challenge of any sort to the
constitutionality of an administrative process may be raised in § 1983
if that process resulted in a sanction that actually affected the
108
duration of custody. According to Heck and Edwards, however, this
is the wrong question; courts are supposed to determine whether a
favorable resolution of the prisoner’s particular challenge would
necessarily imply the invalidity of the decision reached. Wilkinson
itself is a concrete illustration of a permissible § 1983 challenge to a
proceeding that affected the duration of incarceration: in that case,
the prisoners were denied parole, but their procedural challenges
were permitted to go forward under § 1983 because ruling in favor of
the plaintiffs would entitle them to new parole hearings but would not
109
necessarily require them to be granted parole. Courts cannot
categorically rely on the mere fact that the proceedings at issue
lengthened (or failed to shorten) the time spent in jail, because by
doing so they force more cases into habeas than the Court’s precedent
110
requires.
Conversely, allowing more rather than less access to § 1983 than
the Court’s decisions permit, at least one judge has concluded that a
106. See, e.g., Shell v. Brzezniak, 365 F. Supp. 2d 362, 370 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (deprivation of
good-time credits); cases cited infra note 125 (earning status).
107. See, e.g., Adams v. Agniel, 405 F.3d 643, 644–45 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam);
Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024 (9th Cir. 1997); Clark v. Thompson, 960 F.2d 663, 664
(7th Cir. 1992).
108. See, e.g., McMillan v. Fielding, 136 F. App’x 818, 820 (6th Cir. 2005) (good-time
credits); Butterfield, 120 F.3d at 1024–25 (parole); Shell, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 370 (same). Both
McMillan and Shell were decided after Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), but neither
mention it. For a critique of McMillan (and a contrary result), see Woods v. Lozer, No. 3:051080, 2006 WL 3333521, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 16, 2006).
109. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 76.
110. A more elaborate—but no more justified—example of this mistake is a district court
opinion distinguishing the injunctive relief sought in Wilkinson from damages sought for flawed
procedures: the court held that because “the only meaningful money damages would be for a
wrongful continued confinement,” success in the § 1983 would “imply an erroneous parole
decision.” Swimp v. Rubitschun, No. 1:06-CV-592, 2006 WL 3370876, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Nov.
20, 2006). For a contrary case relying on a more careful analysis of Wilkinson, see Armstrong v.
Beauclair, No. CV06-49-S-EJL, 2007 WL 1381790, at *3 (D. Idaho Nov. 29, 2007) (mem.).
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§ 1983 action is viable whenever the plaintiff is seeking “damages for
the respondents’ use of the wrong procedures rather than for their
111
reaching the wrong result.” In a variation on this theme, another
court has suggested that all procedural challenges to parole denials
(but not necessarily to disciplinary sanctions) are cognizable under
112
§ 1983. This process-not-result approach, too, is incorrect under the
precedents: some procedural challenges are precluded in § 1983 under
113
the Court’s doctrine, as Edwards itself illustrates. What the Court
said matters is not whether process or result is challenged but the
logical effect that a favorable ruling for the prisoner would have on
114
the validity of the result of the hearing.
Another attempt at a clearer distinction is to suggest that
challenges to generally applicable procedural rules fall on the
Wilkinson and Wolff side of the line and claimed errors in particular
115
hearings fall on the Edwards side of the line. This is analogous to
other doctrines specifying the type of challenges that may be raised in
other contexts. For example, the Court has held that determining
whether a statute authorizing commitment is civil or punitive depends
on the statutory scheme and not on its application in individual cases;
a plaintiff cannot argue that an otherwise–civil commitment statute is
116
punitive as applied to him. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
federal courts may not hear challenges to particular state court
decisions, but they may hear challenges to the state rules that govern
117
such decisions.

111. Carr v. O’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1128–29 (7th Cir. 1999) (Ripple, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
112. Clark v. Thompson, 960 F.2d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Knock out the parole decision,
knock out the rules for future decisions, knock out the entire institution of parole, and the
sentence remains, establishing lawful custody.”).
113. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 647–48 (1997).
114. Id.
115. Some courts explicitly used this distinction prior to Heck. See, e.g., Serio v. Members of
La. State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1117–18 (5th Cir. 1987). Other courts disagreed. See,
e.g., Gwin v. Snow, 870 F.2d 616, 825–26 (11th Cir. 1989). For an early critique of this
distinction, see Schwartz, supra note 101, at 157–58.
116. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 266–67 (2001).
117. See, e.g., D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 463 (1983) (holding that the
plaintiffs could not challenge the court’s decision to deny them to the bar but could challenge
the bar regulations on which the court based its decision); Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1430
(3d Cir. 1989) (holding that a disbarred attorney could not challenge the state supreme court’s
refusal to reinstate him to the state bar but could challenge rules governing reinstatement
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Decisions purporting to follow this distinction between general
and specific challenges when applying the Preiser doctrine have
nevertheless reached inconsistent results. For example, challenges to
the inclusion of particular testimonial or documentary evidence as
false, biased, or otherwise inappropriate have sometimes been held
118
cognizable under § 1983 and sometimes not. Cases addressing other
challenges to prison administrative proceedings are similarly
119
inconsistent. Even more peculiar, one court has allowed a § 1983
because the relief requested “could affect future decisions of the state supreme court [but]
would not require review of a past decision”). Lower courts have applied this distinction
unevenly, which suggests that such a rule might not be easy to apply. See generally Sherry, supra
note 89 (surveying and critiquing lower court application of the doctrine). Similarly, the Court
has always distinguished between facial and as-applied constitutional challenges, although in
this context as-applied challenges are more likely to succeed. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of N. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961, 967 (2006).
118. Compare Adams v. Agniel, 405 F.3d 643, 644 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (finding that
an allegation that the parole board used erroneous information was cognizable), and Kemp v.
McFarland, 149 F. App’x 91, 93 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (finding that allegations that a
parole hearing involved false and biased testimony were cognizable), and Burnell v. Whidden,
No.3:05CV825(MRK), 2005 WL 2739085, at *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 19, 2005) (finding that an
allegation that a probation officer’s misstatement delayed a prisoner’s release on parole was
cognizable), and Johnson v. Williams, No. 03 C 0764, 2005 WL 1793586, at *1, *6 (E.D. Wisc.
July 27, 2005) (finding that an allegation that the parole board considered false information was
cognizable), with Jeffery v. Owens, 216 F. App’x 396, 397 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (finding
that an allegation that the parole board considered expunged arrests when it denied the prisoner
parole was not cognizable), and Brown v. Dretke, 184 F. App’x 384, 385–86 (5th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (finding that an allegation that the parole board used inaccurate information in denying
parole was not cognizable), and Cherfils v. Jones, No. 3:07cv391/MCR/MD, 2008 WL 817098, at
*1 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2008) (finding that an prisoner’s allegation that corrections officers filed a
false disciplinary report against him was not cognizable), and Graham v. Washington, No.
7:07CV00381, 2007 WL 4613037, at *1 (W.D. Va. Dec. 31, 2007) (mem.) (finding that a
prisoner’s allegation that corrections officials fabricated evidence when depriving him of goodtime credits was not cognizable), and Hawn v. Pavlick, No. 07-110, 2007 WL 1063848, at *1
(W.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2007) (finding that the prisoner’s allegation that the parole board relied on a
false report when denying him parole was not cognizable), and Lynch v. Robinson, No. 02 C
4789, 2002 WL 1949731, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2002) (mem.) (finding that an allegation that
corrections officials relied on a fabricated disciplinary report when depriving the prisoner of
good-time credits was not cognizable); see also Gross v. Quarterman, No. H-04-136, 2007 WL
4411755, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2007) (finding that a claim that the parole board denied
parole based on inaccurate information was not cognizable but a claim that the parole board
failed to give the prisoner an opportunity to correct the inaccurate information was cognizable).
119. Some courts have allowed § 1983 suits alleging the unconstitutional application of
parole guidelines or standards adopted after the prisoner’s conviction, see, e.g., Kyles v. Garrett,
222 F. App’x 427, 428, 430 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Overman v. Beck, 186 F. App’x 337, 338
(4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), the requirement of participation in certain programs as a condition
of parole eligibility, see, e.g., Nelson v. Horn, 138 F. App’x 411, 412 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam);
Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 821 (9th Cir. 1997); Armstrong v. Beauclair, No. CV06-49-S-
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suit challenging the validity of misconduct reports used to deprive a
prisoner of good-time credits, suggesting that whether the reports
were “excessive” is “a separate issue from whether [the prisoner] was,
120
in fact, guilty of the conduct alleged in the reports.” Other decisions
121
ignore this general/specific distinction, which the Court never drew
in the Preiser line of cases.
Even when courts have applied the standard that the Court
actually articulated, however, they have not reached consistent
results. As several courts have explicitly recognized, this problem

EJL, 2007 WL 1381790, at *1, *15 (D. Idaho Mar. 29, 2007) (mem.); Wolfe v. Pa. Dep’t. of Corr.,
334 F. Supp. 2d 762, 764–65 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (mem.), the use of impermissible standards in the
parole decision, Brown v. Johnson, 169 F. App’x 155, 156–57 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), the
routine placement of an inmate charged with a disciplinary violation into administrative
confinement, preventing him from collecting evidence for his defense, Osterback v. Crosby, No.
4:01CV76-WS, 2003 WL 21976145, at *1 (N.D. Fla. June 9, 2003), and the policy of conducting
of a parole hearing via television hookup instead of in person, Yourdon v. Johnson, 128 F.
App’x 833, 834–35 (2d Cir. 2005).
Other courts have concluded that prisoners claiming that they were not permitted to call
witnesses could not proceed under § 1983 (contrary to the outcome in Wolff), Cervantes v.
Pratt, 224 F. App’x 697, 700 (9th Cir. 2007) (mem.); Tompkins v. Dep’t. of Corr., No. 5:07-CT3152-H, 2008 WL 717719, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 2008); Brown v. Johnson, No. 7:07CV00396,
2007 WL 4269234, at *1 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2007) (mem.), that a challenge to legislative changes
to parole standards is equivalent to a challenge to the denial of parole and thus not cognizable
under § 1983, Vaught v. Sampson, No. 08-CV-11040, 2008 WL 927776, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. Apr.
4, 2008), and that challenges to parole conditions must be raised in habeas and not § 1983
despite the fact that they were brought by individuals whose parole had not been revoked and
thus were prospective only, see Lee v. Jones, No. CV 05-789-MO, 2006 WL 44188, at *3–4 (D.
Or. Jan. 9, 2006) (discussing cases).
120. Johnson v. Litscher, 260 F.3d 826, 831 (7th Cir. 2001). Several courts have similarly
concluded that success on a claim for excessive use of force does not necessarily imply the
invalidity of convictions for battery or resisting arrest, and thus the claims are not always barred
under Heck. See, e.g., Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497–99 (5th Cir. 2008); Brengettcy v. Horton,
423 F.3d 674, 683 (7th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 699 (9th Cir. 2005);
Michaels v. City of Vermillion, 539 F. Supp. 2d 975, 990 (N.D. Ohio 2008). But see Ballard v.
Simien, No. H-07-0791, 2008 WL 906531, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2008) (mem.). This distinction
can give rise to difficult evidentiary questions: in 2008 the Seventh Circuit reversed a district
court that had prohibited a prisoner from presenting any evidence about the altercation that led
to both his disciplinary conviction and his claim of excessive force. Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d
899, 902 (7th Cir. 2008).
121. See, e.g., Sams v. Crawford, 197 F. App’x 527, 528 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (allowing
prisoners to pursue a § 1983 claim that the defendants allegedly “fail[ed] to inform them of their
constitutional rights prior to parole-revocation hearings” without specifying whether the
corrections officials’ failure was pursuant to the state’s policy or specific to these inmates).
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stems from the lack of clarity of the Supreme Court precedents. In
Wolff, the Court allowed a § 1983 challenge to disciplinary hearing
procedures that denied the prisoner notice, a written statement of the
factual findings, and the right to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence. But in Edwards, the Court held
noncognizable under § 1983 a claim that disciplinary proceedings
were unconstitutional because the hearing officer “concealed
exculpatory witness statements and refused to ask specified questions
123
of requested witnesses.” There is not a lot of daylight between these
two claims, and lower courts have understandably had a hard time
figuring out the location of the dividing line. Wilkinson further
complicates the problem because almost every case can be described
both as satisfying and as not satisfying the Wilkinson standard: if the
prisoner wins the procedural challenge, it means both that the first
hearing was constitutionally invalid (and thus that the result of the
hearing was invalid) and that the plaintiff is entitled to a new,
124
constitutionally adequate, hearing.
One type of challenge to specific disciplinary proceedings
particularly bedevils courts. Cases challenging the deprivation of
good-time credits are difficult enough to categorize, as we have
shown, but what should happen when the challenge is to a proceeding
that led to a change in custody status that merely prevented an inmate
from earning good-time credits for some period of time? Courts have
125
divided over whether such challenges may be brought under § 1983.
122. E.g., Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 606 (7th Cir. 2004); Clark v. Thompson, 960
F.2d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 1992); Dible v. Scholl, 410 F. Supp. 2d 807, 815, 820 (N.D. Iowa 2006)
(mem.).
123. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644 (1997).
124. Prisoners unschooled in the law are sometimes better able to see this tension than are
courts. One court described a § 1983 plaintiff’s argument as an assertion “that he would have
already been paroled if not for” the use of unconstitutional parole procedures and then held—in
an impeccable application of the precedents—that the plaintiff was permitted to seek a new
parole hearing but not release. Bottom v. Pataki, No. 9:03-CV-835 (FJS/GJD), 2006 WL
2265408, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2006) (mem.).
125. Compare, e.g., Worthen v. Franklin, 186 F. App’x 835, 836–37 (10th Cir. 2006)
(cognizable), and Kemp v. McFarland, 149 F. App’x 91, 92–93 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(same), and Kritenbrink v. Crawford, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1053–54 (D. Nev. 2004) (same), with
Bell v. Wilkinson, 145 F. App’x 169, 170–71 (6th Cir. 2005) (not cognizable), and Montgomery v.
Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644–45 (7th Cir. 2001) (same), and Payton v. Hubert, No. 07-506-A,
2007 WL 4303241, at *1 (M.D. La. Dec. 5, 2007) (same). Another court found that Heck barred
a claim that prison counselors unlawfully removed the prisoner from group counseling that was
a prerequisite for favorable parole consideration. Brooke v. Stevens, No. 4:CV-07-2329, 2008
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There is, finally, the problem of mixed claims. What if a
disciplinary hearing, which is allegedly procedurally inadequate, leads
to the imposition of both a sanction with durational implications and
a sanction without durational implications? For example, a prisoner
might be placed in more restrictive confinement conditions and
deprived of accumulated good-time credits. The former, if imposed
alone, would be cognizable under § 1983 because it does not trigger
Heck at all. The problem is that prevailing in a procedural challenge
to the hearing that imposed restrictive confinement necessarily
implies that the other penalty—the deprivation of good-time credits,
which is clearly within the Heck bar—is also invalid. Two courts have
addressed this situation and have come to different conclusions. The
Seventh Circuit held, with little discussion, that a prisoner could not
126
use § 1983 to challenge disciplinary segregation in this context. The
Second Circuit devised a more ingenious solution: it held that a
prisoner may use § 1983 to challenge the nondurational sanction, but
only “if he agrees to abandon forever any and all claims he has with
respect to the sanctions that affected the length of the
127
imprisonment.”

WL 80043, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2008) (mem.). Some courts have cast the question as turning
on whether officials would retain discretion over the length of the sentence notwithstanding a
court ruling in the plaintiff’s favor. See, e.g., Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2007);
Helm v. Colorado, No. 06-cv-00624-PSF-CBS, 2007 WL 322770, at *2–3 (D. Colo. Jan. 31, 2007);
Beebe v. Heil, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1015 (D. Colo. 2004) (mem.). This approach is merely a
restatement of Wilkinson: because of the officials’ discretion, granting relief would not
necessarily result in the shortening of the plaintiff’s period of incarceration. But as we have seen,
this analysis proves too much, as even invalidating a conviction for errors at trial—the core of
habeas—does not necessarily mean that the prisoner will end up with a shorter sentence on
retrial. Judges and juries have at least as much discretion as parole officers and prison officials.
126. Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 643–44 (7th Cir. 2001). The basis for this
conclusion is not entirely clear; it might have rested on the erroneous premise that any
disciplinary sanction, whether or not it has durational implications, is subject to the Heck bar.
127. Peralta v. Vasquez, 467 F.3d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 2006); accord McEachin v. Selsky, 225 F.
App’x 36, 37 (2d Cir. 2007); Deal v. Yurack, No. 9:04-CV-0072 (LEK/DEP), 2007 WL 2789615,
at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2007); Ford v. Krusen, No. 906-CV-890 FJS/DEP, 2007 WL 804928,
at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007); see also Morales v. Woods, No. 9:06-CV-15 (TJM/GJD), 2008
WL 686801, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2008) (mem.) (citing Peralta to find that because the
plaintiff had been released from prison, his good-time credit claim was moot, so Heck did not
bar nondurational claims arising from same disciplinary hearing); Moore v. Schuetzle, No. 1:06cv-079, 2006 WL 3612857, at *7 n.7 (D.N.D. Nov. 20, 2006) (noting the possibility of such a
waiver). The Peralta court relied on the principle of judicial estoppel to conclude that any
waiver by the prisoner would be enforced in later proceedings. Peralta, 467 F.3d at 105–06.
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In summary, the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court is both
unjustifiable in theory and incoherent in practice, leading to
conflicting decisions by lower courts. Determining whether a claim is
cognizable under § 1983 is not the only problem resulting from the
128
Preiser line of cases, however. Sentence-administration challenges
that are held to fall on the habeas side of the line face a host of
difficulties. The habeas corpus statute and judicial interpretations of it
were designed for collateral review of state judicial decisions.
Applying habeas doctrines to suits challenging what are essentially
state administrative decisions creates a series of mismatches, to which
we now turn.

128. Two side issues under Preiser have also troubled lower courts. Although they are
beyond the scope of this Article, we mention them briefly. First, if § 1983 is available, is it the
exclusive remedy? The Supreme Court has not definitively resolved this question, even for
prison-conditions claims that are clearly within § 1983 (unlike the sentence-administration
claims that are the focus of this article). The circuits are divided. See, e.g., Levine v. Apker, 455
F.3d 71, 76–77 (2d Cir. 2006) (allowing, without discussion, claims cognizable under § 1983 to be
brought in habeas); Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 242–44 (3d Cir. 2005)
(holding that claims cognizable under § 1983 may alternatively be brought in habeas); Beckley
v. Miner, 125 F. App’x 385, 388–89 (3d Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Warmus, 151 F.
App’x 783, 786–87 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (holding that § 2241 is available to a prisoner
whose claim has no effect on the duration of his sentence); Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024,
1030 (9th Cir. 2004) (same); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 864 (10th Cir. 2000) (same);
Brown v. Plaut, 131 F.3d 163, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that habeas “might conceivably be
available” but is not required); Clark v. Thompson, 960 F.2d 663, 664–65 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that claims cognizable under § 1983 may not be brought in habeas); United States v.
Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893–94 (6th Cir. 1991) (same). For a 2007 district court attempt to sort out
the Ninth Circuit’s confusing precedent on this question, see Drake v. Felker, No. 2:07-cv-00577
(JKS), 2007 WL 4404432, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2007). For the effect of our proposal on
this particular controversy, see infra text accompanying note 230.
Courts have also divided about whether the Heck favorable-termination rule applies if the
habeas remedy is unavailable (for example, if the person is not in custody). Compare Mendoza
v. Meisel, No. 07-4627, 2008 WL 726860, at *1 (3d Cir. Mar. 19, 2008) (per curiam) (holding that
a person not in custody is not bound by Heck), and Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875–78 (9th
Cir. 2002) (same), and Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2001) (same), with Entzi v.
Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a person not in custody is bound by
Heck), and Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177–78 (3d Cir. 2006) (same), and Randell v.
Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301–02 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (same), and Gibbs v. S.C. Dep’t. of
Prob., Parole, & Pardon Servs., 168 F.3d 481, 481 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (same), and
Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 81 n.3 (1st Cir. 1998) (same). In 2008 one commentator argued
that Heck should not apply if habeas is unavailable. Note, Defining the Reach of Heck v.
Humphrey: Should the Favorable Termination Rule Apply to Individuals Who Lack Access to
Habeas Corpus?, 121 HARV. L. REV. 868, 889 (2008). This issue can be resolved either way
under our proposal.

2008]

HABEAS CORPUS AND STATE SENTENCING

37

III. WHERE LANGUAGE AND LOGIC COLLIDE: ATTEMPTING TO FIT
SENTENCE-ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS WITHIN AEDPA’S TERMS
Preiser
distinguishes
among
different
challenges
to
administrative proceedings, dictating which must be filed in habeas
and which can be brought under § 1983. The failings we have
catalogued so far arise from that distinction. But the Court’s
unwillingness in these decisions to consider the difference between
challenges to administrative decisions and challenges to state court
judgments also has negative consequences. It means that challenges
to administrative decisions affecting sentence duration, having
nothing to do with the validity of the underlying state court judgment,
will be forced into habeas and governed by the provisions of
AEDPA. When a state prisoner alleges that the duration of his
custody has been affected by a constitutional flaw in a decision by a
state official, however, AEDPA’s language is a nightmare to navigate.
Constitutional attacks on the decisions of corrections and parole
officials do not fit easily within AEDPA’s terms, which were drafted
129
in contemplation of claims challenging state judicial actions.
One set of difficulties arises because, unlike other habeas
petitions challenging convictions and sentences already subject to
review by state courts, a habeas petition attacking a sentenceadministration decision may be the prisoner’s first and only
opportunity for judicial review of that decision. Inmates who
challenge the actions of prison or parole officials might have had
limited access—or no access—to state courts. In all states, a prisoner
can object to the officials’ actions using administrative remedies such
130
as grievances and appeals within the state corrections system. But
after an adverse administrative determination rejecting a prisoner’s
constitutional claim, an inmate may or may not have an opportunity
for review of that determination in state court. All states grant
131
jurisdiction to their courts to review parole revocations, and most

129. See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text.
130. See Brief for the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of the Yale Law School
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 28–31 app., Woodford v. Ngo, 546 U.S. 1167 (2006)
(No. 05-416), 2006 WL 304573 (collecting and describing state prison grievance policies and
procedures).
131. See, e.g., Jackson v. Walker, 206 F. App’x 967, 969 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(Georgia); Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 220–24 (5th Cir. 2004) (Texas); Dill v. Holt, 371
F.3d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir. 2004) (Alabama); Land v. Carroll, 402 F. Supp. 2d 514, 517 (D. Del.
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states provide some judicial review for claims regarding the
constitutionality of procedures leading to the loss of good-time
132
133
credits or the denial of parole without due process or in violation
134
135
of the Ex Post Facto Clause. But some states, including Indiana,
136
137
138
139
Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming provide no

2005) (mem.) (Delaware); Scales v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 396 F. Supp. 2d 423, 428
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (New York).
132. See, e.g., Fleming v. Quinn, 251 F. App’x 447, 447 (9th Cir. 2007) (mem.) (Washington);
Aguilar v. Endicott, 224 F. App’x 526, 527 (7th Cir. 2007) (Wisconsin); Sells v. McDaniels, 234
F. App’x 608, 609 (9th Cir. 2007) (mem.) (Nevada).
133. See, e.g., Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850–51 (9th Cir. 2007) (California); Cotten v.
Davis, 215 F. App’x 464, 467 (6th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (Tennessee); Williams v. Bartlett, 201
F. App’x 501, 502 (9th Cir. 2006) (mem.) (Oregon); Whiteman v. Friel, 191 F. App’x 820, 821
(10th Cir. 2006) (Utah).
134. See, e.g., Crank v. Jenks, 224 F. App’x 838, 839 (10th Cir. 2007) (Oklahoma); Dyer v.
Bowlen, 465 F.3d 280, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2006) (Tennessee); Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 998
(9th Cir. 2005) (Oregon); Parker v. Kelchner, 429 F.3d 58, 61 (3d Cir. 2005) (Pennsylvania);
Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004) (Montana); see also Lynce v. Mathis, 519
U.S. 433, 439–47 (1997) (granting a Florida prisoner’s habeas challenge to a statute cancelling
provisional release credits as violating the Ex Post Facto Clause); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S.
24, 35–36 (1981) (granting habeas relief after finding that a statute that retroactively eliminated
gain-time release credits violated the Ex Post Facto Clause); Adam Liptak, Contemplating the
Meaning of ‘Life,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2007, at A10. Liptak observes,
Courts in other states have also been struggling with how far states can go in
changing their pardon and parole systems retroactively. In 1997, for example, the
Pennsylvania board of pardons reserved a seat for a crime victim and required a
unanimous rather than majority vote.
Last year, a lower court ruled that those changes violated the ex post facto clause.
Id. For a fifty-state survey of postconviction remedies for state prisoners, see the three-volume
work by DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF
HANDBOOK WITH FORMS (2007 ed. 2006).
135. Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Indiana does not provide judicial
review of decisions by prison administrative bodies . . . .”).
136. Jackson v. Jamrog, 411 F.3d 615, 617, 621 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding a state statute
passed in 2000 that removed access of prisoners denied parole to state courts but preserved the
power of prosecutors and victims to appeal to state courts); Rouse v. Lafler, No. 06-10724, 2007
WL 4239209, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2007) (explaining that Michigan law offers three possible
avenues to challenge administrative actions in state courts, but prisoners cannot appeal a denial
of parole under any of them).
137. McAleese v. Brennan, 483 F.3d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 2007) (permitting a prisoner to file a
habeas corpus petition in federal court without exhausting state court remedies because
Pennsylvania law provides no way to challenge a decision to deny discretionary parole); DeFoy
v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 445 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[C]laims of constitutional violations in the
denial of parole in Pennsylvania need not be presented to the state courts via a petition for writ
of mandamus in order to satisfy the requirement of exhaustion.”).

2008]

HABEAS CORPUS AND STATE SENTENCING

39

judicial review whatsoever of at least some of these constitutional
claims. These circumstances complicate the application of the habeas
statute, which was designed to provide limited collateral review of
state court decisions, not direct review of state administrative
decisions.
Since AEDPA was enacted, courts have divided over the
application of at least five different specific aspects of habeas review
140
to these cases. We examine each of these five disputes in turn.
A. Jurisdictional Basis—§ 2241 or § 2254?
The analysis of any federal case begins with identifying the
specific statute that provides jurisdiction. When the claim is a state
prisoner’s habeas petition challenging a sentence-administration
decision, judges cannot even get this far without disagreeing. The
problem that has split the lower courts is whether § 2241 or § 2254 is
the appropriate basis for claims by state prisoners challenging, not the
imposition, but the administration of their sentences. The problem
arises because § 2254 (but not § 2241) applies only to persons “in
141
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court.” Prisoners who
raise sentence-administration challenges can be characterized as both
within and outside this language: the initial decision to incarcerate the
inmate is pursuant to a state-court judgment, but the challenged
decision, to keep him incarcerated, is not.
Section 2241 of the habeas statute sets out the general authority
to grant the writ and includes the requirement that the custody be “in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
138. Morgan v. Dretke, 433 F.3d 455, 456–57 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that filing “step one”
and “step two” administrative grievances exhausts state remedies when challenging a
disciplinary proceeding in Texas).
139. Brown v. Wyo. Dep’t of Corr. State Penitentiary Warden, 234 F. App’x 874, 876–77
(10th Cir. 2007) (holding that a prisoner did not have to challenge in state court a due process
violation during the disciplinary process to exhaust state remedies). Until 2006, Oklahoma
courts did not review constitutional challenges to disciplinary hearings. See Gamble v. Calbone,
375 F.3d 1021, 1026–27 (10th Cir. 2004) (determining that Oklahoma law did not permit state
courts to review a disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good-behavior credits), overruled by
Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 818–19 (10th Cir. 2007).
140. For a review of some early cases as of the end of 2002, see Eric Johnson, An Analysis of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in Relation to State Administrative Orders: The
State Court Judgment as the Genesis of Custody, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 153, 162–66, 181–90 (2003).
141. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000).
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States.” This section was untouched by AEDPA and continues to
provide for federal review of those claims of unconstitutional custody
raised by state and federal prisoners that do not fall within either
143
§ 2254 or § 2255, which contain AEDPA’s restrictive requirements.
In AEDPA, Congress attempted to streamline collateral
remedies for both state and federal prisoners. Congress’s efforts to
streamline collateral remedies for federal prisoners are found in
144
§ 2255, while the primary limitations on collateral remedies for state
145
prisoners are found in §§ 2244 and 2254. Additionally, § 2253(c)(1)
requires both state and federal prisoners to secure a certificate of
146
appealability before appealing a district court’s decision. Section
2254 applies to constitutional challenges brought by inmates who are
147
“in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,” and the
relevant portions of § 2244 either use the same phrase or specify that
they apply to petitions brought “under section 2254” and thus
148
incorporate the same language by reference. The parallel provision
for federal prisoners (§ 2255), however, applies to claims by a federal
prisoner that his “sentence” was “imposed in violation of the
149
Constitution.” This difference in language has led courts to treat
state and federal prisoners raising identical claims very differently.
Lower courts agree that challenges to the administration of a
federal sentence, including prison decisions affecting good-time
credits, are not among the collateral attacks on the sentence itself that
must be brought under § 2255. Instead, because they are not alleging
that their sentences were “imposed” unconstitutionally, federal
prisoners attacking the administration of their sentences may proceed
under § 2241. They need not comply with the AEDPA restrictions in
150
§ 2255.

142. Id. § 2241(c)(3).
143. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001).
144. 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
145. Id. §§ 2244, 2254.
146. Id. § 2253(c)(1).
147. Id. § 2254(a).
148. Id. §§ 2244(b)(1)–(2), (c), (d)(1).
149. Id. § 2255 (emphasis added).
150. See, e.g., Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241–43 (3d Cir. 2005)
(collecting authorities).

2008]

HABEAS CORPUS AND STATE SENTENCING

41

Of the circuits that have examined this issue for state prisoners,
however, most have held that state prisoners with sentenceadministration claims are “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court” and thus must file under § 2254, even though the alleged
constitutional violation did not affect the validity of the state court
151
judgment. The Tenth Circuit, however, disagrees. In the Tenth
Circuit, sentence-administration claims by both federal and state
152
prisoners must be filed under § 2241.
Judging by the hundreds of pages that have been devoted to this
issue in briefs and federal decisions, one might think that it would be
a key determinant of which of the various AEDPA restrictions courts
will apply in these cases. Remarkably, the resolution of this question
actually makes little difference in which restrictions courts will apply.
The Seventh Circuit insists that sentence-administration petitions be
filed under § 2254, then refuses to apply many of the statutory
153
restrictions that govern other § 2254 cases. The Tenth Circuit insists
that these petitions be filed under § 2241, then applies the restrictions
154
governing § 2254 cases anyway. Courts are divided over the
application of three restrictions in particular: the statute of
limitations, the successive petition bar, and the certificate of

151. These courts reason that any other interpretation would undercut the congressional
goal of limiting habeas review for state prisoners through restrictions found in § 2254. See, e.g.,
White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If we were to allow White to proceed
under [§ 2241], he would not be subject to: (1) the one-year statute of limitations . . . ; (2) the
extremely deferential review of state court decisions under [§§ 2254(d)(1) and (2)]; (3)
AEDPA’s limitations on successive petitions . . . ; and (4) state court exhaustion
requirements.”); Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1060 (11th Cir. 2003) (“To read §§ 2241
and 2254 other than as we do would effectively render § 2254 meaningless because state
prisoners could bypass its requirements by proceeding under § 2241.”); see also Dill v. Holt, 371
F.3d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that § 2254(e)’s exhaustion requirement applied to a
parole revocation challenge because the parolee was “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
state court” even though the parole board, an administrative body, returned him to prison);
Greene v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 265 F.3d 369, 371–72 (6th Cir. 2001) (deferring to the statute’s
“plain and broad language”).
152. Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 865 (10th Cir. 2000); see also Medberry, 351 F.3d at
1062 n.8 (characterizing Tenth Circuit precedent that “permits state prisoners to proceed under
§ 2241 when it would permit a federal prisoner to file a similar petition” as “disregard[ing]
crucial textual differences between § 2254 and § 2255”). Judge Tjoflat has offered a third
interpretation, that both theories of exclusivity are wrong and that Congress created “two routes
to achieving the same goal [when] one is easier or otherwise more attractive than the other.” See
Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 812 (11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
153. See infra notes 163, 188 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 162, 187 and accompanying text.
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appealability. A fourth aspect of habeas review—procedural
default—has also proved problematic.
B. Statute of Limitations
One of the most important new restrictions that AEDPA added
to habeas review was the statute of limitations in § 2244(d)(1), which
by its terms applies only to prisoners “in custody pursuant to the
155
judgment of a State court.” It was designed to ensure that federal
courts grant relief only to those state prisoners who speed their way
to federal court after exhausting state judicial remedies. Delay in
156
capital cases was the primary target of this provision. Nevertheless,
AEDPA’s text applies to all prisoners who claim they have been
convicted and sentenced in violation of the Constitution.
The limitations period advances two goals. First, it reduces the
possibility of losing evidence the state needs for retrial or
resentencing: if the writ is granted, less time will have elapsed since
the state judgment was first entered. Second, the time limit assures
the finality of the state prisoner’s conviction and sentence. Once the
filing period has passed, victims can rest assured that no further
challenge to the judgment is possible unless the claim fits within the
statute’s narrow exceptions. That, at least, was the idea behind adding
a statute of limitations. The filing deadline advanced the finality of
state criminal judgments and protected the state against the loss of
the proof it might need should retrial be required. It had nothing to
do with how states administered criminal judgments that were already
final.
Given this mismatch, courts understandably have had difficulty
determining when to apply the statute of limitations provision to
habeas petitions challenging sentence-administration decisions. The
most popular approach has been to apply the limitations period to all
claims raised by state prisoners. This approach relies on the
“judgment of a state court” language of § 2244. These courts do not
apply the statute of limitations to claims of unconstitutional pretrial
and prejudgment detention (when petitioners also have little

155. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000).
156. See supra note 63.
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157

incentive to delay filing) but do apply it to claims that after the
prisoner was committed to prison, state officials violated the
158
Constitution by revoking release or deferring release through the
159
160
161
denial of parole, revocation of good-time credits, or other action.
Even the Tenth Circuit, which concluded that these sentenceadministration claims do not fall within § 2254 generally, has held that
162
they do for purposes of the statute of limitations. For these courts, a
prisoner’s custody is “pursuant to the judgment of a state court” as
long as the custody was initially authorized by a state court judgment.
The Seventh Circuit interprets the very same language in § 2244
differently, requiring a tighter causal link between specific custody
and a state court judgment. If a prisoner would have been released
sooner but for a decision by state administrative officials, then the
prisoner is not “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court”;
157. See, e.g., Walck v. Edmondson, 472 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding, and
collecting authority from other circuits, that § 2241 is the proper avenue by which to challenge
pretrial detention on the ground of double jeopardy); Stringer v. Williams, 161 F.3d 259, 262
(5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that petitioners held pursuant to state court judgments should file
habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 but petitioners attacking their pretrial detention should
bring habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
158. See, e.g., Peoples v. Chatman, 393 F.3d 1352, 1353 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Cook
v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 278–79 (2d Cir. 2003).
159. See, e.g., Gonzales-Mendoza v. Morgan, 235 F. App’x 534, 535 (9th Cir. 2007) (mem.)
(holding that AEDPA’s statute of limitations applies to a challenge to a denial of parole);
Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the statute of
limitations applied and characterizing the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation as “strained” and
“unpersuasive”); Wade v. Robinson, 327 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that the
prisoner’s habeas petition was time-barred under the statute of limitations).
160. See Allen v. White, 185 F. App’x 487, 491 (6th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (holding that the
statute of limitations applies to petitions challenging a decision to revoke good-time credits);
White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1007–08 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a prisoner attacking an
administrative decision is still a person in custody pursuant to a state court judgment for
purposes of § 2254 and therefore the statute of limitations applies); Medberry v. Crosby, 351
F.3d 1049, 1062 (11th Cir. 2003) (applying the statute of limitations to prison disciplinary
actions).
161. See Rutledge v. Quarterman, No. H-07-3160, 2008 WL 548792, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 26,
2008) (applying the statute of limitations to an ex post facto challenge alleging that the state
retroactively enforced new parole regulations); Rider v. Quarterman, No. 3:07-CV-0789-N, 2007
WL 4226378, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2007) (applying the statute of limitations to a habeas
petition challenging an alleged miscalculation of street-time credit).
162. See Dulworth v. Evans, 442 F.3d 1265, 1267 (10th Cir. 2006) (deciding, as a matter of
first impression, that the statute of limitations in § 2244 applies to petitions challenging
administrative decisions because such challenges are filed by persons in “custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court” but reiterating that such challenges must be filed under § 2241 as
attacks on the administration of a sentence).
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he is in custody pursuant to that administrative decision, and no time
163
bar applies. The Third Circuit has in dicta suggested yet another
approach—distinguishing between administrative decisions that
reincarcerate a prisoner who was previously released and decisions
164
that delay the initial release of a presently incarcerated prisoner.
As for the courts that do apply the statute of limitations to these
claims, they do not agree about when the limitations period begins to
165
run: is it when the administrative decision is first made, when the
166
administrative appeal of that decision becomes final, or some other
167
time? The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have also extended equitable

163. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
Cox is in prison pursuant to the judgment of a state court; otherwise he would not be
eligible for federal habeas corpus. . . . But the custody he is challenging, as distinct
from the custody that confers federal jurisdiction, is the additional two years of prison
that he must serve as the result of the “judgment” not of a state court but of the
prison disciplinary board.
Cox v. McBride, 279 F.3d 492, 493 (7th Cir. 2002).
164. See McAleese v. Brennan, 483 F.3d 206, 214 (3d Cir. 2007) (suggesting that it would
make sense to apply the time bar to those claims challenging disciplinary and parole decisions
made before release but not to those challenging a revocation of release).
165. See Bachman v. Bagley, 487 F.3d 979, 983–84 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the statute of
limitations begins when administrative decision is first made but is tolled during pendency of
prison grievance procedures); see also Wade v. Robinson, 327 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the limitations period for a parole denial claim begins when parole was denied);
Kimbrell v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 2002) (same); Rutledge, 2008 WL 548792, at *3
(finding that an ex post facto challenge to parole procedures filed in 2007 was time barred
because the limitations period began to run when the prisoner was first denied parole using
those procedures in 2002).
166. See Dulworth v. Evans, 442 F.3d 1265, 1268 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that the
limitations period for an Oklahoma prisoner’s ex post facto challenge did not commence until
the decision rejecting his administrative appeal became final); Ali v. Tenn. Bd. of Pardon &
Paroles, 431 F.3d 896, 897 (6th Cir. 2005) (assuming, without deciding, that the statute of
limitations period begins to run when the administrative decision to deny parole becomes final
and is tolled during state judicial review).
167. See Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the limitations
period for a habeas claim challenging a disciplinary hearing began one day after the prisoner
received notice that his administrative appeal was denied); Cook v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole,
321 F.3d 274, 280 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the limitations period began when the petitioner
was notified of the decision); Burger v. Scott, 317 F.3d 1133, 1138 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that
the limitations period for a parole deferral challenge started on the date the petitioner learned
of the change in parole date); see also Roberts v. Vaughn, 203 F. App’x 130, 131 (9th Cir. 2006)
(mem.) (holding that the limitations period begins when the factual basis for a claim could have
been discovered with due diligence if that basis is not the decision itself); Goodwin v. Dretke,
150 F. App’x 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (same).
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other courts have yet

C. Successive Petition Bar
Another problematic AEDPA provision is the bar against
170
successive petitions, § 2244(b). By its terms the bar applies to
171
applications under § 2254—which, as noted, itself applies only to
prisoners “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”
Because the same language describes both cases subject to the
successive petition bar and those subject to the statute of limitations
172
bar, one might expect that courts would interpret these two
provisions to cover the same cases. Instead, the Seventh Circuit has
held that the successive-petition provision applies to sentenceadministration challenges by state prisoners, but the statute of
173
limitations provision does not; while the Second, Fifth, and Tenth

168. See Burger, 317 F.3d at 1144 (explaining that on the “unique facts of [this] case,”
petitioner “diligently pursued his judicial remedies and failed to timely file his federal petition
due solely to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control”); see also Gonzales-Mendoza v.
Morgan, 235 F. App’x 534, 535 (9th Cir. 2007) (mem.) (finding that the statute of limitations
applied to a Washington prisoner’s challenge to a denial of parole but instructing the district
court, on remand, to determine if the limitations period should be equitably tolled because the
state created an impediment to discovering the constitutional violation under 28 U.S.C. § 2244
(d)(1)(B) by failing to provide the prisoner with a Spanish language translation of the board’s
decision); cf. Rutledge, 2008 WL 548792, at *5 (assuming that equitable tolling may be available
but finding that the prisoner’s claim was not tolled because he failed to exercise reasonable
diligence and no “rare and exceptional” conditions existed to justify tolling the limitations
period).
169. See, e.g., Rider v. Quarterman, No. 3:07-CV-0789-N, 2007 WL 4226378, at *3 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 30, 2007) (denying equitable tolling and noting that the petitioner should have filed
his petition within a year of revocation when claiming that he was denied street-time credit for
the time he spent out on parole).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2000).
171. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
172. Compare, however, Rittenberry v. Morgan, 468 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 2006), a case
presenting a second challenge to an underlying conviction. The Sixth Circuit agreed that
because AEDPA changed the successive petition provision from language referencing petitions
on behalf of persons “in custody pursuant to a state court judgment” to language referencing
applications “under Section 2254,” Congress “apparently chose to distinguish between petitions
filed under section 2254 in section 2244(b) as opposed to petitions filed on behalf of persons in
custody pursuant to a state court judgment.” Id. at 335. The court held that the successive
petition bar applies anyway, noting that although there is “no meaningful way to explain the
inconsistencies in the wording,” it “reveals nothing more than poor draftsmanship.” Id. at 336–
37.
173. See Harris v. Cotton, 296 F.3d 578, 578–79 (7th Cir. 2002).
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Circuits apply to these cases the statute of limitations provision, but
174
not the successive-petition bar.
And those courts that apply the successive-petition provision to
sentence-administration claims have also reached different
conclusions about how it works. The first issue is determining when a
petition seeking relief for an unconstitutional sentence-administration
decision is successive to a petition challenging the underlying
sentence itself. Generally, because the two petitions challenge two
separate decisions, they would not be considered successive any more
175
than two petitions challenging two separate successive convictions.
But if the sentence-administration claim was ripe by the time an

174. Consider, for example, Vasquez v. Parrott, 318 F.3d 387 (2d Cir. 2003), in which the
Second Circuit stated: “It is manifest that in designing the standards under which a second or
successive petition would be allowed, Congress was contemplating only petitions that
challenged the lawfulness of the conviction and not the sort of petition” advanced in that case.
Id. at 392. The court also noted that federal prisoners who bring similar challenges would have
filed under § 2241 and would not have had to seek a certificate from the court of appeals and
that “we have no reason to believe that Congress intended its second or successive petition rule
to function differently in this respect as between federal and state prisoners.” Id. at 392 n.1. The
Second Circuit has interpreted the language “second or successive” petition to mean only when
the claim asserted did exist at the time of the earlier petition. James v. Walsh, 308 F.3d 162, 168
(2d Cir. 2002).
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits use the pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ doctrine to screen
successive sentence-administration challenges. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Janecka, 191 F. App’x 717,
718 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that a New Mexico prisoner’s § 2241 petition, which presented no
new grounds for relief, was subject to dismissal as a successive petition “unless the ends of
justice require consideration of the merits” and noting that when a successive § 2241 petition
raises a new claim, a court may decline to hear the claim under the doctrine of abuse of the
writ); In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 236–37 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Congress did not intend for the
interpretation of the phrase ‘second or successive’ to preclude . . . relief for an alleged
procedural due process violation relating to the administration of a sentence of a prisoner who
has previously filed a petition challenging the validity of his conviction or sentence, but is
nevertheless not abusing the writ.”).
175. See, e.g., Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A] subsequent
petition that challenges the administration of a sentence is clearly not a ‘second or successive’
petition within the meaning of § 2244 if the claim had not arisen or could not have been raised at
the time of the prior petition.”); Hill v. Alaska, 297 F.3d 895, 898–99 (9th Cir. 2002); Crouch v.
Norris, 251 F.3d 720, 725 (8th Cir. 2001) (“‘[S]econd or successive’ remains a term of art that
must be given meaning by reference to both the body of case law developed before the
enactment of AEDPA and the policies that prompted AEDPA’s enactment.”). But cf. Spivey v.
State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 279 F.3d 1301, 1304 n.4 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)
(concluding that a death row prisoner’s allegation that the state’s clemency process violated due
process was successive because the prisoner brought it after his first habeas petition); id. at
1305–06 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (arguing that the challenge was not successive because the
alleged violation had not occurred at time the prisoner filed his first petition).
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earlier petition challenging the underlying sentence was filed, is the
sentence-administration petition successive? The Sixth and Ninth
176
177
Circuits have answered yes, the Fifth Circuit has said maybe, the
178
Tenth Circuit has said no, and other circuits have yet to weigh in. A
second difficulty in applying the successive-petition provision to these
claims is determining when one administrative challenge is
“successive” to another petition challenging a similar, but separate,
179
sentence-administration decision.
Finally there are the statutory exceptions to the successive
petition bar, which make little sense in these cases. As written, the
exceptions appear to have no applicability whatsoever to claims
challenging the decisions of prison and parole officials. The first
exception allows a successive petition that raises a claim that “relies
on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
180
collateral review by the Supreme Court.” It is difficult to imagine a
context in which the Supreme Court would recognize a new
constitutional right for parole and good-time proceedings and apply
that rule retroactively. The second exception will never apply: it
requires that the petitioner show that but for the error alleged “no
reasonable fact-finder would have found the applicant guilty of the
181
underlying offense,”
and prisoners challenging sentence-

176. See, e.g., In re Marsch, 209 F. App’x 481, 482 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that by the time
petitioner had filed his first habeas petition, the petitioner could have discovered the factual
predicate for his parole denial claim and thus his subsequent petition was a successive petition);
Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (finding that a sentenceadministration claim was successive and denying the prisoner’s petition).
177. See Crone v. Cockrell, 324 F.3d 833, 836–37 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that a prisoner’s
second habeas application was an abuse of the writ because he failed to bring the jail-time
credit-calculation claim in his initial petition despite knowing the miscalculation, although he
did not exhaust that claim in the preceding filing).
178. Heckard v. Tafoya, 214 F. App’x 817, 820 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Mr. Heckard’s § 2254
petition is not a ‘second or successive’ petition because it is his first collateral challenge to his
state conviction, whereas his prior § 2241 habeas petition challenged the administration of his
sentence.”).
179. In 2007 the Third Circuit went out of its way to “express no opinion as to whether the
restrictions on filing second or successive habeas corpus claims in [§ 2244] might have been
applicable if McAleese filed or sought permission from us to file a petition challenging [his later]
parole denials.” McAleese v. Brennan, 483 F.3d 206, 219 n.19 (3d Cir. 2007).
180. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2000).
181. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
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administration decisions do not contest their guilt of the underlying
182
offense.
D. Certificate of Appealability
Courts also divide over whether a petitioner must obtain a
certificate of appealability prior to appealing a district court’s
disposition of a sentence-administration challenge. Section
2253(c)(1)(A) requires a petitioner to obtain a certificate of
appealibility before appealing orders in a habeas corpus proceeding
“in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by
183
a State court.” If the provision applies, then the prisoner must
demonstrate that “jurists of reason could disagree with the district
court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could
conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve
184
encouragement to proceed further.” If the provision does not apply,
no permission is needed prior to filing the appeal.
The Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits all apply other
§ 2254 limitations to these administrative challenges and have
disregarded the difference in statutory language between § 2254’s
phrase “pursuant to a judgment of a state court” and § 2253’s terms
“detention complained of arises out of process issued by a state
court.” These courts either find that the more natural reading is to
185
conclude that these two different phrasings mean the same thing or
apply
the
certificate-of-appealability
requirement
without

182. The underlying offense is the original state crime for which the prisoner is serving time.
See, e.g., Vasquez v. Parrott, 318 F.3d 387, 391 (2d Cir. 2003). Struggling to make sense of this
statute as applied to sentence-administration claims, however, at least one court has decided
that the phrase “underlying offense” in another context refers to a subsequent infraction for
which the prisoner was convicted at a later disciplinary hearing and formed the basis for an
adjustment in an otherwise early release date. See infra note 198.
183. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A).
184. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).
185. See Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1063 (11th Cir. 2003); Greene v. Tenn. Dep’t of
Corr., 265 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a petitioner who appeals the resolution of a
§ 2241 petition challenging the administration of a sentence must obtain a certificate); Coady v.
Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2001) (requiring a petitioner to obtain a certificate of
appealability before challenging a denial of parole); see also Madley v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 278
F.3d 1306, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that a certificate is required “when the [District of
Columbia’s] prisoner’s detention originated in state court process, even if a later decision of a
parole board to deny parole or reparole is the more immediate cause of the prisoner’s
continuing detention”).
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186

discussion. The Tenth Circuit agrees that § 2253 governs sentenceadministration claims even though it continues to maintain that
187
§ 2254 does not. The Seventh Circuit’s position (which it admits is
“contradictory” with its other decisions) is that although jurisdiction
under § 2254 for sentence-administration challenges is established
because “custody” in such cases is “pursuant to a state court
judgment,” the “detention” of a prisoner challenging the
administrative decision that is keeping him incarcerated “arises out
of” that administrative decision. It is not a “process issued by” a state
188
court; therefore, no certificate of appealability is required. Like the
Seventh, the Ninth Circuit does not require a certificate in these
189
cases.
E. Procedural Default
Finally, there is one further difficulty in applying AEDPA to
sentence-administration claims, although it does not arise (as the
other problems do) from the mismatch between the claims and the
186. See Houser v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 560, 561 (5th Cir. 2004) (denying a certificate to a
petitioner alleging that he was denied due process at a disciplinary hearing).
187. See Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 818 (10th Cir. 2007); Boutwell v. Keating, 399 F.3d
1203, 1211 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 866–89 (10th Cir. 2000).
188. See Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 637 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that when the
immediate cause of a prisoner’s detention is a prison disciplinary proceeding, the resulting
detention does not arise out of process issued by a state court); see also Andersen v. Benik, 471
F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 2006) (“In Walker, we explained that ‘we do not see how we can construe
the words, ‘process issued by a State court’ to mean ‘process not issued by a State court, but
instead the outcome of an internal prison disciplinary proceeding.’ . . . Because Anderson is
challenging the actions of corrections officials, rather than his conviction or sentencing in state
court, we determined that Anderson did not need a COA. We see no reason to revisit that
decision or to overturn Walker as the state requests.”). But see Walker, 216 F.3d at 642–44
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that Congress could not
have intended to limit federal review of a sentence imposed by a state court but allow
unfettered appeals from parole decisions). Judge Easterbrook dissented in Walker and, writing
in a later case, reminded his colleagues that the opinion contains an internal contradiction,
terming it based on a “counter-textual conclusion.” Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 980 (7th
Cir. 2002).
189. See White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004) (considering a case in which
the petitioner was in custody pursuant to a state court judgment but challenging his
imprisonment that “originate[d]” or “spr[u]ng[]” from the decision of the department of
corrections and noting that “[h]ad Congress intended that every state prisoner obtain a COA
before appealing, irrespective of the nature of the challenge, it easily could have said so”); Hess
v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 514 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Because Hess is
challenging an administrative decision to postpone his parole and not his underlying state court
conviction, he did not need to obtain a certificate of appealability . . . .”).
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text of the statute. State prisoners seeking relief under § 2254 must
190
exhaust “the remedies available in the courts of the State.” Courts
agree that any state prisoner seeking habeas relief under either § 2254
or § 2241 from an administrative decision must exhaust available state
191
court remedies when those remedies exist. They also agree—both
before and after AEDPA—that despite what appears to be an
express legislative command to exhaust judicial remedies,
192
administrative remedies must be exhausted as well.
But what happens if a prisoner fails to present his sentenceadministration claim to a state court at the time (or in the manner)
specified by state law and the state court thus refuses to consider that
claim? He has no further state remedies available, but he did at one
time. In typical habeas petitions challenging the constitutionality of a
state criminal judgment, such a claim is considered procedurally
“defaulted,” and will not be reviewed by a federal court unless the
petitioner can show either: (1) cause for his default and prejudice
from the absence of federal court review or (2) that it is more likely
than not that the constitutional violation resulted in the conviction of
an innocent person (known as the “miscarriage of justice”
193
exception).

190. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(A) (2000).
191. See, e.g., Parker v. Kelchner, 429 F.3d 58, 61 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that a prisoner
challenging parole denial on the ground of ex post facto must seek relief first in Pennsylvania
courts, but not if the challenge to denial is on other grounds for which there is no state court
review); Jackson v. Jamrog, 411 F.3d 615, 621 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that Michigan inmates
wrongfully denied parole on a basis recognized as illegal must seek relief through state habeas
actions and mandamus unless they are challenging the board’s discretionary determination not
to grant release); McAtee v. Cowan, 250 F.3d 506, 508 (7th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting that
Illinois and Wisconsin provide judicial review of prison disciplinary hearings, which inmates
must exhaust before filing in federal court, but Indiana does not); Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d
627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that prisoners challenging parole after committing a territorial
offense must exhaust their remedies in the territorial court).
192. See, e.g., Dulworth v. Evans, 442 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 2006) (post-AEDPA).
Courts also reached this conclusion before AEDPA. See Markham v. Clark, 978 F.2d 993, 994
(7th Cir. 1992) (holding that an Indiana state prison’s disciplinary panel was tantamount to a
“state court” for purposes of the § 2254(b) exhaustion requirement and explaining that the court
“d[id] not think ‘courts’ in section 2254(b) should be interpreted as being limited to tribunals
presided over by persons who are called judges and wear robes” and that “the term as it appears
in this statute should be read to embrace any tribunal that provides available and effective
corrective process”).
193. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 499 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment). A prisoner can also overcome procedural default by showing that the procedural
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Because a prisoner with a sentence-administration claim must
pursue administrative as well as judicial appeals (if available),
applying the rules of procedural default to these claims is challenging.
The difficulty of determining when the prisoner’s failure to meet an
administrative regulation bars federal review has begun to plague
federal courts that are considering challenges to administrative
decisions under § 1983. The Supreme Court held in 2006 that the
PLRA requires proper exhaustion of administrative remedies by
prisoners bringing § 1983 claims but left open the possibility that a
194
failure to exhaust could be excused. The same problems arise when
the same decisions of state prison and parole officials are challenged
195
in habeas. Both of the exceptions designed for habeas claims
challenging criminal judgments—“cause” and “miscarriage of
196
justice”—are difficult to apply to sentence-administration claims.
Arguably, the miscarriage of justice exception has no meaning in this
context because it requires a showing that the challenged action led to
the conviction of an innocent person. No matter what prison and
parole officials do, their actions take place after the underlying
conviction and cannot affect the accuracy of that conviction one way
197
or the other. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit has extended the

rule is not “firmly established and regularly followed.” See James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348
(1984).
194. See Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382–83 (2006); id. at 2403 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also, e.g., Robin L. Dull, Note, Understanding Proper Exhaustion: Using the
Special-Circumstances Test to Fill the Gaps Under Woodford v. Ngo and Provide Incentives for
Effective Prison Grievance Procedures, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1947 (2007).
195. See, e.g., Hamm v. Saffle, 300 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that the rule was
regularly and evenhandedly applied and the claim procedurally barred); Moffat v. Broyles, 288
F.3d 978, 981–82 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that an Indiana prisoner objecting to a disciplinary
decision must seek review from the warden and then from a statewide body called the Final
Reviewing Authority and failure to do so constitutes default).
196. The most common “cause” alleged in ordinary habeas claims for the failure to raise a
claim is the ineffective assistance of counsel, but there is generally no right to counsel in either
state administrative or state collateral review of these decisions. These proceedings are
navigated by prisoners without attorneys, just as in § 1983 cases. See, e.g., Greene v. Bartlett, 213
F. App’x 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2006) (mem.) (holding that a petitioner defaulted his ex post facto
claim regarding parole denial when he failed to raise it in Oregon state courts); Whiteman v.
Friel, 191 F. App’x 820, 821 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that a Utah prisoner’s due process claims
regarding a parole hearing were not exhausted because he failed to seek timely review from the
Utah Supreme Court and were also procedurally defaulted).
197. See, e.g., Bain v. Hofmann, No. 2:06-CV-59, 2007 WL 4268919, at *7 (D. Vt. Nov. 30,
2007) (finding that the petitioner did not raise his claim that corrections officials failed to count
good time properly until after his good-time credits were revoked and holding that because Bain
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miscarriage of justice exception to this context, considering not
whether the petitioner may be innocent of the underlying crime, but
whether the petitioner may be innocent of the prison misconduct that
198
led to the state’s refusal to allow earlier release.
*
*
*
This chaotic precedent among the circuits concerning the
application of a federal statute warrants legislative intervention.
These cases impose a serious cost, especially considering that
thousands of them are filed each year and that the best estimate is
that courts end up rejecting the inmates’ claims in 99.7 percent of
them.
IV. A NEW APPROACH
If, for these sentence-administration claims, the Preiser doctrine
and the existing statutory provisions have outlived their usefulness,
what is a better approach? Any satisfactory solution to this problem
should meet five requirements: (1) it should clarify the distinction
between cases that must be filed in habeas and cases that need not be,
so that it is easier to administer (thus eliminating the problem we
identified in Part II.B); (2) it should be consistent with the principles
governing federal review of state decisions identified in Part II.A; (3)
it should reduce or eliminate the square-peg problems raised by
trying to fit these claims into AEDPA’s language, problems identified
in Part III; (4) it should improve (or at least not decrease) the
accuracy and efficiency with which federal courts deal with the tidal
wave of complaints filed by state prisoners, helping them to identify
potentially meritorious cases and to dispose of nonmeritorious ones

“[wa]s not challenging his underlying conviction . . . the refusal to consider his petition will not
result in a miscarriage of justice, [and] his default should not be excused”); Kelly v. Quarterman,
No. C-07-259, 2007 WL 4267165, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2007) (refusing to excuse the
procedural default because the “[p]etitioner has offered neither good cause for his default nor
new evidence of innocence”).
198. Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 820 (10th Cir. 2007) (considering an allegation of
innocence of the disciplinary offense); Hamm, 300 F.3d at 1216 (rejecting a petitioner’s claim as
defaulted when he was unable to show he was actually innocent of drinking alcohol while in the
pre-parole conditional supervision program, “the offense for which he [had] been punished”);
cf. Wilson v. Penn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14325, at *8–9 (M.D. Pa. 2008)
(mem.) (finding no basis for the prisoner’s allegation that he was innocent of the parole
violation leading to his parole revocation, the failure to attend anger management class).
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quickly; and (5) it should strike an appropriate balance between state
responsibility for state prison systems and federal oversight of the
constitutional rights of prisoners.
Of these requirements, we have already discussed the first four;
only the last needs elaboration. An appropriate balance between state
and federal supervision of state prisons should both encourage states
to provide their own judicial safeguards against the errors or abuses
of state corrections officials and provide federal oversight when it is
needed. Encouraging states to provide judicial as well as
administrative review of the actions of prison administrators serves
both state and federal interests. It allows states the first opportunity
to interpret their own statutes and regulations and to remedy their
own failings. At the same time, it reduces the burdens on federal
courts by encouraging a remedy that may obviate the need for federal
review. In addition, federal judicial review need not be as searching if
state courts have already reviewed an inmate’s claims and the federal
courts are not providing the sole opportunity for judicial review, a
premise underlying much of AEDPA itself. Any proposed scheme
should recognize this distinction and reward states that provide
judicial review with less intrusive federal oversight.
In this Part, we offer a tentative outline of one possible scheme
that satisfies these five requirements. Section A lays out (and
justifies) the basic lines of demarcation and Section B provides the
procedural details.
A. Three Easy Pieces
The Preiser doctrine requires a court to ask only one question:
would granting the requested relief necessarily imply the invalidity of
199
the fact or duration of the prisoner’s incarceration? But the
question itself is difficult to answer, it is the wrong question from the
perspective of principle, and the consequences that follow from the
answers under the two existing statutory schemes create even more
difficulties. We propose instead to substitute three easy questions and
a statutory modification designed specifically to accommodate these
intermediate cases.
The first question is whether the challenged decision was made
initially by a state court or by a state administrator (such as a prison
199. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973).
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or parole official). This first question divides the universe of prisoner
cases into two groups: those that attack a state court’s imposition of
sentence and all other cases. If the prisoner is not attacking the
imposition of sentence, and an administrator made the decision being
challenged, the second step is to ask whether that decision affected
the duration of incarceration. This step subdivides the cases attacking
administrative decisions into two groups: those challenging decisions
that have an effect on the duration of incarceration—administration
of sentence claims—and those challenging everything else—prison
conditions claims. Finally, for cases challenging sentence
administration, the court should ask whether the state provides
judicial review of the initial decision. Graphically, the scheme looks
like this:
Q1: Who initially made the challenged decision?
Court
(imposition of sentence)

Other official
If so, ask:
Q2: Did the decision affect
the length of incarceration?

Yes
No
(administration of sentence)
(conditions)
If yes, ask:
Q3: Does the state provide judicial review of the initial decision?

Question #1: Who initially made the challenged decision? The
distinction drawn by answering the first question needs little further
explanation. Suits that challenge a conviction or sentence imposed by
a court all fall into the category of sentence imposition. Under
existing law, all of these challenges must be brought as habeas
petitions, and we do not suggest here any change to that result nor to
200
the statutory standards for reviewing such claims under AEDPA.
This is also the line drawn between § 2241 and § 2255 for federal

200. See supra text accompanying notes 45–50. This is not to say that both of us agree with
all of the policy choices Congress made when enacting AEDPA. Section 2254(d) in particular
gives more deference to state courts than one of us would find optimal. Nevertheless, we agree
that the deference due the decisions of state courts should be greater than that given to the
decisions of other state officials.
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prisoners. Section 2255 is available for challenges to sentence
201
imposition, and § 2241 for challenges to sentence administration.
The fact that federal courts seem to have no difficulty applying this
distinction for federal prisoners suggests its simplicity. What makes
this distinction so much simpler than the one in Preiser is that, unlike
Preiser, it does not attempt to distinguish among decisions made by
administrators. Our second question then turns to the difficult cases
under Preiser.
Question #2: Did the decision affect the length of incarceration?
Under Preiser, whether § 1983 is available depends on whether
granting the prisoner the relief he requests would necessarily imply
the invalidity of the administrative decision reached through the
202
challenged procedure. As we demonstrated in Part II.B, this
question can almost always be answered either way, and so it is no
surprise that courts have trouble with it. Some challenges to
procedures used in the course of deferring or denying parole or
revoking credits will be found to qualify, and some will not.
The key to our proposal lies in its substitution of the second
question, which focuses on the actual effect of the administrative
decision, for the current question under Preiser, which focuses on the
necessary effect of the requested relief. Asking whether the
administrative decision itself actually affected the duration of
incarceration is much more tractable than speculating about whether
particular relief necessarily implies particular results and provides an
easy way to distinguish between challenges to prison conditions and
challenges to sentence administration. It is almost always easier to
determine whether an event in the past has some present effect than
it is to determine whether a proposed judicial ruling now will have
some effect in the future.
Our scheme also eliminates the subsidiary questions that courts
have asked when they try to apply Preiser. Under our regime, it does
not matter whether the prisoner is asking for damages, a new hearing,
or the reinstatement of good-time credits. It does not matter whether
the prisoner attacks the procedure or the result. It does not matter

201. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. For federal prisoners, § 2241 is also the
appropriate vehicle for challenging parole revocation, and thus parole revocation should fall
into the sentence-administration category for state prisoners as well.
202. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490.
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whether the alleged constitutional defect was a general policy or a
specific application of that policy. What matters is only that state
officials made a decision that extended the duration of custody.
In effect, the first two questions together take all of the hard,
could-go-either-way-under-Preiser challenges to administrative
decisions and place them into a new category. The first question
separates out challenges to the original conviction or sentence from
challenges to postcommitment administrative decisions, and the
second question separates this second group into two: prisonconditions claims and the new category, sentence-administration
claims. Challenges that courts have always categorized as § 1983
cases—deprivation of work or library privileges and the like—will
remain in the prison-conditions category; the new category is for
challenges to administrative decisions that actually affected the
duration of custody.
So far, then, we have satisfied requirement (1): both of the first
two questions are easy to administer. By creating a new category of
claims, we can both tailor remedies to the core principles identified
earlier (requirement (2)) and address directly the square-peg
problems (requirement (3)), through a separate statutory scheme for
sentence-administration challenges. We propose not the dichotomous
scheme under which sentence-administrations claims must conform to
provisions designed for other sorts of claims, but a three-tiered system
of federal review: habeas for challenges to custody imposition, § 1983
(as modified by the PLRA) for challenges to prison conditions, and a
separate scheme for sentence-administration challenges (those
attacking decisions that affected the duration of custody). Creating a
third type of review reduces the square-peg problems by recognizing
what is unique about sentence-administration claims: they challenge
decisions made by nonjudicial actors (like prison-conditions claims
but unlike custody-imposition claims), and they challenge decisions
that affect physical liberty (like custody-imposition claims, but unlike
prison-conditions claims).
Because federal review of claims attacking administrative
decisions that affect custody itself should be at least as rigorous as,
and perhaps more rigorous than, federal review of challenges to state
court judgments or administrative decisions affecting only the
conditions of custody, the baseline for these challenges should be the
PLRA rather than habeas. Applying a PLRA-like regime rather than
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trying to squeeze sentence-administration claims into AEDPA’s
poorly fitting text satisfies requirement (3), because most of the
square-peg problems arise from the attempt to apply the courtfocused habeas requirements to decisions made by administrators.
Using the PLRA as the baseline for the procedures that should
apply to sentence-administration claims also helps to satisfy
requirement (4) by allowing courts to more easily separate
meritorious from nonmeritorious claims. The PLRA offers several
innovations that have helped to “filter out the bad claims and
203
facilitate consideration of the good.” It requires exhaustion of
204
administrative remedies, makes prisoners with sufficient funds pay a
partial filing fee at the initiation of the suit and the balance over
205
time, conditions future filings upon the payment of the full filing fee
from the prisoner’s account if the prisoner has previously filed three
206
or more nonmeritorious claims, and requires the court to screen the
207
complaint before requiring an answer from the defendant. Imposing
these requirements on prisoners challenging sentence-administration
decisions should help reduce their incentive to file nonmeritorious

203. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 914 (2006). Commentators have assessed the effect of the
PLRA. E.g., MARGO SCHLANGER & GIOVANNA SHAY, ISSUE BRIEF: PRESERVING THE RULE
OF LAW IN AMERICA’S PRISONS: THE CASE FOR AMENDING THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM
ACT 2 (2007), http://www.acslaw.org/node/4587 (arguing that the “PLRA has had a salutary
effect” on the problem of frivolous filings, has “drastically shrunk the number of cases filed,”
and “further reduce[d] the burden on correctional officials by requiring courts to dispose of
prisoner civil rights cases if they are legally insufficient without even notifying the sued officials
that they have been sued,” but arguing that it has also prevented “legitimate claims”); Ostrom et
al., supra note 4, at 1528 (“Our goal is to assess the manner in which the PLRA has affected the
volume, trend, and outcomes of prisoner lawsuits.”); Schlanger, supra note 2, at 1584, 1634–64
(stating that the PLRA has reduced the number of inmate filings but has not facilitated
successful outcomes in potentially meritorious cases).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000).
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2000).
206. See id. § 1915(g).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2). We recognize that the PLRA itself is controversial and that
many scholars believe that it unnecessarily restricts the ability of prisoners to challenge prison
conditions. See, e.g., SCHLANGER & SHAY, supra note 203, at 2; Susan N. Herman, Slashing and
Burning Prisoners’ Rights: Congress and the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229,
1231 (1998); Schlanger, supra note 2, at 1664. We express no opinion on whether the PLRA
might be too harsh in other respects or whether it should be amended. We suggest only that
whatever balance is appropriate for prison-conditions claims (attacking not the decisions of
courts but the actions of those who work within a state’s corrections system) should
presumptively apply to sentence-administration claims attacking decisions made by those same
corrections officials.
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claims and thus make the federal courts’ task easier. But wholesale
shifting of all sentence-administration claims into § 1983 creates some
difficulties for requirement (5) that any better approach must satisfy,
which leads to the third of our three simple questions.
Question #3: Does the state provide judicial review of the initial
decision? The one difficulty with starting with the PLRA standards as
a baseline for sentence-administration claims, however, is that if the
PLRA or its analog applies to sentence-administration challenges as
well as to prison-conditions cases, states would have no incentive to
provide their own judicial review of administrative decisions affecting
the duration of custody. When state judicial remedies for these claims
already exist, allowing prisoners to bypass those remedies would
mean not only that the state would lose its own judiciary’s expertise in
applying the state’s parole and good-time laws and regulations (as
well as whatever remedies are available under state law) but also that
the federal courts would lose this expertise as well. When state
judicial remedies do not exist, states would have no incentive to
provide them. Requirement (5) is not satisfied.
The last of our proposed questions matters because whenever a
challenge to an administrative decision affecting the duration of
custody is not reviewable in state court, the PLRA baseline should
apply. When a state does provide judicial review of the sentenceadministration claim, a more deferential approach—containing
elements of both the PLRA and habeas—is appropriate. In the next
Section, we turn to that structure.
B. A Tailored Statutory Scheme
To recap, we have discussed a number of important distinctions.
Challenges to decisions by administrators that affect the duration of
custody deserve federal review that is at least as generous as that
afforded administrative actions affecting the conditions of
confinement, hence the PLRA rather than AEDPA should serve as
the baseline. Put differently, when a federal judge provides the only
opportunity for judicial review of the constitutionality of the actions
of corrections officials, a prisoner who alleges that the custody itself is
unconstitutional should not for that reason be disadvantaged
compared to a prisoner who alleges unconstitutional conditions of
custody.
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Moreover, AEDPA restricts federal review of state prisoners’
constitutional challenges to the legality of confinement, but the
restrictions are designed to channel collateral federal review of state
criminal judgments. The restrictions in AEDPA make little sense
when the review that a federal judge provides does not supplement
judicial remedies provided by the state but is instead the first and only
judicial review available to the prisoner. Collateral review may be
more restricted than primary review. Indeed, a dual approach that
limits collateral but not primary review finds support in the different
provisions of AEDPA applicable to federal prisoners. Section 2255
requires that a federal prisoner who claims that “the sentence was
imposed in violation of” federal law, like a state prisoner attacking a
criminal judgment, must comply with filing deadlines, successive
petition bars, and more. These requirements presuppose that federal
prisoners have the opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of
their convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Federal prisoners
who do not claim that their sentences were “imposed” illegally need
not comply with these requirements.
Our proposed solution for sentence-administration claims by
state prisoners builds upon these important distinctions. When a state
does not provide judicial review of a claim alleging that the decisions
of corrections or parole officials violated the Constitution and
affected the duration of custody, then the procedures that govern
cases alleging other unconstitutional actions by prison officials should
apply. In other words, unless federal judicial review is collateral to
state judicial review, the PLRA, not AEDPA, should govern. Section
A.1 discusses in more detail the procedures that should be applied to
these claims for which state court review is unavailable. When federal
review of sentence-administration claims by state prisoners is
collateral to state judicial review, more restrictions on federal relief
make sense, but as we have seen, some of the particular restrictions
specified in AEDPA for challenges to state criminal judgments do not
fit this context at all. Section A.2 outlines the procedures that should
be applied when federal review of sentence-administration claims is
collateral to state judicial review.
1. When Federal Court Review Is the Only Judicial Review
Available. Consider a case like that of a prisoner from Indiana
claiming a constitutional flaw in the hearing that led to the revocation
of good-time credits. For this prisoner, the only judicial review
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available for his constitutional claim is in federal court. That claim
should be governed by the same rules that would apply if the prisoner
was alleging any other unconstitutional action by prison officials
208
under the PLRA. It makes little sense to apply to such a claim the
four procedural limitations applied in habeas cases, all of which were
designed to restrict federal habeas review of state court judgments—
the statute of limitations, the successive petition bar, the certificate of
appealability requirement, and the unique procedural default rules of
habeas. Thus, when the state has not authorized its courts to review a
sentence-administration claim, the following rules should apply:
1. The filing deadlines that courts impose in § 1983 cases, instead of
AEDPA’s statute of limitations provision;
2. The same simple collateral estoppel and res judicata rules for civil
litigation that now control repeated challenges to the same
administrative decisions in § 1983 litigation, instead of the
successive petition provisions of AEDPA;
3. The right to appellate review of an adverse decision of the district
court absent certification by the trial court that the appeal is not
209
taken in good faith, as in any § 1983 case, instead of the prior
authorization for appeal required by AEDPA; and
4. The exhaustion and procedural default rules that courts use in cases
filed under the PLRA, instead of the habeas procedural-default
210
rules that were designed to respect the decisions of state courts.
We recognize that the default and exhaustion limitations for § 1983
211
plaintiffs under the PLRA are new and controversial.

208. This includes the filing fee and screening provisions of the PLRA, which we also
suggest should apply even when a state does provide judicial review. See supra text
accompanying notes 203–208.
209. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) (“An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial
court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.”).
210. An additional analysis of the original data from KING ET AL., supra note 69, showed
that the default defense was rarely discussed in sentence-administration decisions. Moreover,
cases raising sentence-administration claims in which at least one claim was dismissed as
defaulted tended to take twelve days longer, on average, than cases with sentenceadministration claims in which no claims were dismissed as defaulted, which suggested that
avoiding the merits through default actually takes longer than discussing and then denying each
claim on the merits.
211. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 914–16 (2007); Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382–
83, 87 (2006). For criticism of extending procedural default rules to the PLRA exhaustion, see
Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1774–76; Giovanna Shay & Johanna Kalb, More Stories of
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We propose only that whatever approach to exhaustion and
default is adopted for § 1983 claims, it should also apply whenever a
state court provides no judicial review of a prisoner’s challenge to an
administrative decision regarding the administration of sentence,
regardless of whether the prisoner seeks release, damages, or
injunction.
Eliminating these habeas-specific requirements would also bring
the procedure for federal review of these claims closer into line with
the procedure applied when federal prisoners raise identical sentence212
administration claims under § 2241.
2. When Federal Review Is Collateral to State Review. When a
state does provide an opportunity for judicial review of a sentenceadministration claim, collateral review of the claim in federal court
need not be as exacting as it is when federal review is the only judicial
review available. In such a situation, existing habeas law provides a
useful baseline, modified to avoid the mismatches we detailed in Part
III.
a. Exhaustion, Procedural Default, and Certificates of
Appealabilty. Of the four habeas-specific restrictions we canvassed in
Part III, two—the procedural default rules, and the certificate for
appeal—can easily continue to apply to sentence-administration cases
when state judicial review is available, just as they do in other habeas
213
cases. State court review, enforced through default rules, advances

Jurisdiction-Stripping and Executive Power: Interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 291, 297, 329–30 (2007).
212. See supra notes 151 and 174 (stating that the statute of limitations and successive
petition provisions in § 2255 do not apply to federal prisoners who are not challenging the
imposition of sentence and instead are filing under § 2241). It is not necessary for a federal
prisoner to obtain a certificate of appealability before appealing a final decision of a district
court on a § 2241 claim. See McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 810 n.1 (10th Cir.
1997).
213. We recognize that one aspect of procedural default for federal collateral review of
sentence-administration claims may generate disagreement: whether the “miscarriage of justice”
exception should apply. Because the rules of procedural default are judicially created rather
than established under AEDPA, any decision about whether to apply this exception can be
accomplished by judicial action and need not be formalized in a statute. The purpose of the
exception in ordinary habeas cases is to reduce the likelihood that a procedural misstep prevents
relief for someone who is both innocent and the victim of a constitutionally defective process.
The Tenth Circuit has concluded that this same reasoning applies if a constitutionally flawed
administrative hearing results in the continued incarceration of someone who does not deserve
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the timely consideration of these claims by state officials who are in a
position to correct problems sooner and allows state courts to
interpret their own state laws and regulations. Providing an
opportunity for state judicial review also could support narrowing of
federal review through screening appeals.
Two other AEDPA provisions, however, are so ill suited to these
claims that they should not carry over to sentence-administration
cases, even to those with state judicial review.
b. Statute of Limitations. It is inappropriate to insist that
sentence-administration claims adhere to the rigid statute of
limitations period that is designed to limit delay in filing challenges to
the judgment itself. The reasons that support a filing deadline do not
really apply in these cases. First, the time bar protects the finality of
the criminal judgment. But a rigid statute of limitations for sentenceadministration claims does nothing to protect the finality of the
underlying criminal judgment. The validity or finality of original
convictions and sentences are never in jeopardy, no matter how long
prisoners delay raising their sentence-administration claims.
The filing deadline for challenges to convictions and sentences
also reduces the risk that delay in seeking collateral relief could result
in the loss of witness testimony or other evidence, thereby
jeopardizing the state’s capacity to reconvict should relief be
214
granted. But the same risk is not present when the challenge is to an
administrative decision resulting in the denial of early release from a
lawfully imposed term. If an administrative decision affecting the
timing of release is flawed, relief can often be provided without a
to serve his full time because he has not committed misconduct. See supra note 198. Under this
approach, if a prisoner procedurally defaults a claim attacking the constitutionality of a hearing
that found misconduct, the miscarriage of justice exception should be satisfied when the
prisoner can show factual innocence of that misconduct. An alternative approach would be to
conclude that the miscarriage of justice exception should be unavailable except when reviewing
defaulted claims by prisoners who are probably innocent of the underlying crime. Because
challenges to the administration of sentence contest only the inability to obtain release earlier
than the lawfully imposed sentence term, under this approach a petitioner could never show that
unconstitutional action by the state after his commitment to prison for an offense somehow
operated to taint the earlier conviction or sentence for that offense.
214. There are reasons to doubt this rationale for noncapital filers. Tellingly, several states
that impose a statute of limitations for filing state postconviction challenges in capital cases still
prefer to use the doctrine of laches in noncapital cases. See, e.g., 1 WILKES, supra note 134,
§§ 7.13, 7.50 (California); 2 WILKES, supra note 134, §§ 7.14–.15 (Indiana); 3 WILKES, supra note
134, §§ 39.9–.10 (Oklahoma); id. §§ 46.12, 46.20 (Texas).
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rehearing, merely by correcting good-time calculations or the date of
projected release. Even if administrators opted to hold a new
administrative hearing, a successful challenge would never force the
state to return to the state courts to establish guilt or aggravating
sentencing factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, no special
incentive is needed to encourage noncapital prisoners to file their
215
challenges to sentence-administration decisions promptly.
Not only is the statute of limitations unjustified in this context, it
appears to be counterproductive. The 2007 empirical study of
litigation under AEDPA suggests that in cases raising sentenceadministration claims, applying AEDPA’s statute of limitations
provision fails even as an efficiency-promoting measure. Applying the
present statute of limitations provision to these claims may very well
have increased litigation costs for the states and the federal courts,
instead of reducing them. If we look at a sample of all noncapital
habeas cases, those dismissed as filed too late do tend to be dismissed
more quickly than others, suggesting that the time bar at least saves
time for the federal courts and presumably for the state attorneys who
216
must defend these cases. But examining solely the cases within the
sample that raised sentence-administration challenges, suggests that
applying the time bar may have the opposite effect. Cases with
sentence-administration challenges that were dismissed as timebarred took longer, on average, to complete in district court than
cases with sentence-administration claims that were not dismissed as
217
time-barred. One likely explanation is that these particular claims
215. Proponents of the time bar enacted as part of AEDPA pointed to death row prisoners
who appeared to be in no hurry to complete postconviction proceedings in state court or who
were waiting until execution was upon them before commencing what might be their last chance
at relief, that is, habeas corpus review in federal court. See, e.g., Federal Habeas Corpus Reform:
Eliminating Prisoners’ Abuse of the Judicial Process, supra note 63, at 29 (statement of Daniel
E. Lungren, Att’y Gen. of California); id. at 58 (statement of Gale A. Norton, Att’y Gen. of
Colorado); id. at 72 (testimony of Daniel E. Lungren, Att’y Gen. of California). The vast
majority of inmates in state prisons, however, are not death row inmates and will eventually be
released. These prisoners, serving noncapital sentences other than life without the possibility of
parole, would presumably be less inclined to deliberately postpone federal review of the legality
of their custody.
216. KING ET AL., supra note 69, at 74.
217. Additional means comparisons using the original data collected for the study, id.,
revealed that cases with sentence administration claims that were dismissed as time-barred
averaged several weeks longer from filing to disposition in the district court than cases with
sentence-administration claims that were not dismissed for this reason, see id. at 84. Cases with
time-barred claims took longer on average to resolve than cases without time-barred claims
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tend to be easier to resolve on the merits than the variety of claims
that prisoners raise to challenge their state criminal judgments, and
the statute of limitations questions are harder. The law regarding the
limited class of constitutional violations alleged in these cases is
relatively cut and dried, the hearing records are compact and readily
available, and the low standard of proof required at these
administrative hearings means that courts will find most violations
218
harmless anyway. And as we showed in Part III, applying the
AEDPA statute of limitations to these claims is anything but cut and
dried.
In sum, applying the complicated timing rules of AEDPA’s
statute of limitations in a context in which they were not intended to
apply has real costs for federal courts and state attorneys that may
dwarf any savings that result from avoiding the merits in these
particular cases. Congress already recognized the better policy when
it decided not to hold similarly situated federal prisoners to the one219
year deadline. The rule of laches applied to federal prison petitions
raising sentence-administration claims (and governed all state
petitions prior to AEDPA) is more appropriate than the statute of
limitations provision for any case that challenges an administrative
decision by parole and corrections officials.

even after excluding cases filed in districts within the Seventh Circuit, which does not apply the
statute of limitations to challenges to decisions made by administrators, see Cox v. McBride, 279
F.3d 492, 493–94 (7th Cir. 2002), and where district courts are generally speedier at resolving
noncapital habeas petitions than elsewhere, KING ET AL., supra note 69, at 75. This difference in
the speed of resolution between cases with and without time-barred claims held true even when
comparing cases within individual circuits and states.
218. For example, consider Grossman v. Bruce, 447 F.3d 801 (10th Cir. 2006), in which a
prison official who denied a prisoner’s request to have a guard testify did not make the required
individualized determination that the testimony would be unduly hazardous to institutional
safety or correctional goals, but the court concluded that the error was harmless:
We have held in the context of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit, that a prisoner cannot
maintain a due process claim for failure to permit witness testimony if he fails to show
that the testimony “would have affected the outcome of his case.” Every other circuit
to consider the precise question before us has applied harmless error review to habeas
petitions in similar contexts.
Id. at 805. The Second Circuit has also held that any procedural error in inmates’ disciplinary
proceedings was harmless. Powell v. Coughlin, 953 F.2d 744, 750 (2d Cir. 1991).
219. The Sixth Circuit has admitted that applying the statute of limitations to sentenceadministration cases creates “the arguably anomalous situation that state prisoners challenging
the execution of their sentences are subject to the one-year statute of limitations, while similarly
situated federal prisoners are not subject to such a time limit.” Ali v. Tenn. Bd. of Pardon &
Paroles, 431 F.3d 896, 898 (6th Cir. 2005).
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c. Successive Petition Bar. The successive petition bar of
AEDPA should also be abandoned for these claims even when
220
federal review is collateral to state review. The same preclusion
rules used for § 1983 claims would be a less troublesome option.
Alternatively, a return to the familiar pre-AEDPA standard for abuse
221
of the writ, articulated in McCleskey v. Zant and applied whenever
federal prisoners bring sentence-administration claims, would be an
improvement and would also align the standards for state and federal
222
prisoners.
d. Filing Fees. In addition to exempting these cases from the
statute of limitations and successive petitions bar, we suggest one last
statutory amendment that would depart from existing habeas rules.
Sentence-administration claims, like other claims brought by
prisoners challenging what happens to them while they are in custody,
suffer from three broad problems: prisoners have every incentive to
file suit and little reason not to, the vast majority of claims are
223
nonmeritorious, and inmates almost always lack counsel so it is
difficult to find the meritorious needle in the nonmeritorious
haystack. Thus, despite the fact that these sentence-administration
claims implicate physical liberty, it makes sense to impose on them
the same disincentives, screening devices, and procedural hurdles
applied to other challenges to administrative actions by corrections
officials. Of the innovations of the PLRA designed to reduce the
burdens of frivolous filings, two already have analogs in habeas:
administrative exhaustion and screening before the defendant is
224
required to respond. But the five-dollar filing fee still applied in

220. It is not clear whether any savings to the state follow from the application of a federal
successive-petition bar in this context. Although the number of cases in the study sample was
too small to make definitive findings, additional analysis of the original data from KING ET AL.,
supra note 69, showed that cases with sentence-administration claims that were dismissed as
successive did not take any less time to complete than cases with sentence-administration claims
that were not dismissed for this reason. Federal district courts do not often apply the successive
petition bar to these sorts of claims. Only eight of the cases including sentence-administration
claims were determined to be successive, and they took longer, on average, to complete than
cases that were not dismissed for this reason. A larger sample would be required to assess
whether applying the successive petition bar is associated generally with longer disposition
times. Nor is it known whether there are savings to the state from appellate denials of successive
petition applications.
221. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 467–68 (1991).
222. See Vasquez v. Parrott, 318 F.3d 387, 391–92 (2d Cir. 2003).
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225

habeas cases (and waived with a showing of in forma pauperis status
226
in about 36 percent of cases ) offers no disincentive to filers of
227
frivolous allegations regarding disciplinary and parole decisions. We
suggest, therefore, that the PLRA filing fee and penalty scheme
should also be applied to sentence-administration claims, even those
reviewable in state court and brought under the proposed new habeas
section for such claims. Applying the penalty and screening provisions
of the PLRA to sentence-administration claims both improves the
efficiency with which federal courts deal with such cases and provides
a disincentive to filing meritless claims.
C. Implementation
Achieving this more rational system would require two relatively
straightforward statutory amendments. First, and most important,
would be a new provision added to the habeas statute that would
specifically govern claims challenging the constitutionality of a state
228
administrative decision that affected the duration of custody. This

223. See supra text accompanying notes 73–75.
224. Courts already required administrative exhaustion of claims filed under the habeas
statute that attacked administrative decisions affecting the duration of sentence. See supra text
accompanying note 192. The screening requirement that the PLRA added for § 1983 cases, see
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (2000), resembles the screening already required for all habeas petitions
under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts, see 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
225. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2000).
226. KING ET AL., supra note 69, at 23 (noting that of the study sample, 2384 noncapital
cases, 56.1 percent included an IFP motion, and 64.4 percent of these were granted by either the
trial or appellate court).
227. Keeping the lower fee makes sense, however, for inmates who challenge the legality of
their convictions and sentences in federal habeas. The stakes are higher: federal habeas
challenges to convictions and sentences determine whether the state can lawfully punish the
person at all, and access to federal habeas review may be the petitioner’s only chance other than
certiorari to raise either new evidence of innocence or a rule of constitutional procedure that is
so fundamental that the Court has decided to apply it retroactively.
228. An alternative would be to amend each of the problematic sections of AEDPA
(§§ 2244, 2253, and 2254) individually to specify the circumstances under which they would and
would not apply and craft a new section covering only brand new requirements, such as the
filing fee provisions. Although this would be an improvement over the status quo, a separate
section detailing the specific procedures for these claims is probably simpler, minimizes the risk
that changes to existing sections would have unintended effects for challenges to state criminal
judgments, enables a tailored response to these unique claims, including the imposition of filing
fees, and allows for adjustments in the future should other problems arise regarding these
claims.
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new statutory section would provide that these claims are governed
229
by §§ 2254 and 2253(c); that the filing fee requirements of the
PLRA apply; that the statute of limitations and successive petition
provisions (§§ 2244(b) and (d)) do not apply; and that if the state has
provided an opportunity for judicial review, the new provision is the
exclusive statutory source of relief, but that if the claim is one for
which the state provides no judicial review, the inmate may seek relief
230
under either § 1983 or the new section.
Second, an amendment to the PLRA would authorize for this
latter category of cases—challenges to administrative decisions
affecting the duration of custody but unreviewable in state court—the
relief available under the habeas statute, that is, release from custody.
These changes would solve all of the problems we have
identified, problems that will only get worse as prison populations,
231
sentence lengths, and habeas filings continue to swell. Creating a
separate statutory provision for sentence-administration claims
eliminates any guesswork about where to file each type of claim or
which of the various provisions in AEDPA applies. Exempting these
claims from the restrictions of §§ 2244(b) and (d) means that courts
no longer have to fit square pegs into round holes. Adding the filing
fee requirements increases the efficient resolution of meritorious
claims by reducing the number of frivolous claims.
Finally, our proposal provides an incentive for states to authorize
state judicial review of administrative decisions that affect the
duration of custody, because it ensures that federal courts will
exercise more exacting review of decisions of corrections officials in
states that have not authorized judicial review. When states authorize
229. Thus the exhaustion, standard of review, record, and counsel provisions in § 2254 would
all continue to apply. Section 2253(c)(1)(A) would also require some adjustment of the
troublesome “arises out of process issued by a State court” language.
230. Thus, for prisoners in states that provide no judicial review, § 1983 and the new section
in habeas would both be available. This resolves (for prisoners raising sentence-administration
claims in these states) the circuit split identified supra note 128, on whether § 1983 is the
exclusive remedy when it is available.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 49–53. For statistics on the continued rise in habeas
filings, see FRED L. CHEESMAN II ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A TALE OF TWO
LAWS REVISITED: INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF THE PRISONER LITIGATION REFORM ACT
AND THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY (2004), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_PreCiv_TwoLawsRevPub.pdf, and Tables B1A and C2 of the annual reports of the Administrative Office of the Courts, Judicial Business of
the U.S. Courts, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html.
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judicial review of sentence administration claims, prisoners under our
proposal must exhaust those state court remedies and file their claims
under the new habeas section, which would require a federal habeas
court to apply the heightened deference to legal and factual findings
232
made in “State court proceedings.” When state courts provide no
judicial review, prisoners may opt to file their claims in § 1983 with no
habeas restrictions at all or file under the new habeas section for
challenges to administrative decisions. Either option would subject
the state’s action to more intrusive federal review than would be the
case if state judicial review of the claim had been made available by
the state, because there would be no state court proceedings to trigger
the heightened deference required by § 2254. In other words, by
declining to review these claims in its own courts, a state forfeits the
233
deference its decisions would otherwise receive. A state interested
in assuring that prisoners litigate all sentence-administration claims
under the new habeas provision for these claims and not under § 1983
need only grant jurisdiction to its courts to review these claims in the
first instance.
CONCLUSION
Congress has recognized repeatedly that when it comes to federal
review of claims of unconstitutional state action raised by prisoners,
one size does not fit all. It has developed in the PLRA and AEDPA
two separate remedial routes: one governing allegations of
unconstitutional action by prison officials and the other governing
allegations of unconstitutional state court judgments. Within habeas,
it has decided that federal prisoners’ claims ought to be subject to
different restrictions depending on whether the claims challenge the
imposition or the administration of a federal sentence. Even within
AEDPA, for review of the same sort of claim, that is, the alleged
unconstitutionality of a state judgment in a capital case, it concluded

232. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 424 (2000).
233. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, when a state “has chosen not to make judicial process
available to review prison disciplinary board decisions . . . the state may not benefit from §
2254(d)’s limitation on the scope of collateral attack with respect to those decisions.” Piggie v.
McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (explaining White v. Ind. Parole Bd.,
266 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 2001)); see also Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2007);
Pannell v. McBride, 306 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). The same approach applies
to factual findings under § 2254(e). See Piggie, 277 F.3d at 926.
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that restrictions on federal review could vary based on the
234
opportunities for redress in state court. These statutory responses
followed profound changes in the law defining the claims that
prisoners can raise as well as changes in prison populations. Similar
changes warrant another look at the set of neglected claims we
examine in this Article. In particular, we suggest statutory reforms
that recognize the distinctive nature of sentence-administration
claims. These reforms need not be extensive: make § 1983 available
for sentence-administration claims that are not reviewable in state
courts, exempt all sentence-administration claims from the parts of
AEDPA that are ill suited to such claims, and impose the PLRA’s
filing-fee incentive structure on sentence-administration claims
brought in habeas.
The story we relate here about the litigation of sentenceadministration claims also echoes another familiar pattern, repeated
throughout the American criminal justice system, as changes in the
substantive law of sentencing generate unanticipated procedural
challenges for courts. The consequences for state corrections
administration of the fundamental change from indeterminate to
235
determinate sentencing are only now coming to light. This Article
uncovers yet another set of problems that no one saw coming. The
curious tale of state prisoner attacks on the administration of their
sentences is a pointed reminder of the interdependency of substance
236
and procedure in the enforcement of criminal law.

234. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–64 (2000) (providing even more restricted procedures for capital
cases from states certified as having “established a mechanism for providing counsel in
postconviction proceedings”).
235. See PETERSILIA, supra note 33, at 61 (“California’s use of determinate sentencing has
had an extraordinary and destructive effect on the operation of the state correctional system,
the result of structural consequences that were not anticipated when the measure was passed in
the 1970s.”); supra text accompanying notes 27–36 (describing the litigation and legislative
developments following the Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington clarifying scope of the
right to jury under mandatory guidelines schemes).
236. This critical relationship was recognized famously by Professor William Stuntz. See
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice,
107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).

